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Abstract:	  This	  article	  argues	  that	  corporate	  legal	  scholarship	  needs	  to	  focus	  primarily	  upon	  the	  
indeterminacy	   of	   essentialist	   theories	   about	   the	   corporation.	   This	   will	   result	   in	   greater	  
pluralism,	   since	   no	   essentialist	   legal	   theory	  would	   become	  heavily	   privileged	   over	   any	   other.	  
When	  such	  a	  balance	   is	  created	  between	  theories,	  a	  robust	  debate	  can	  occur	  where	  no	   ideas	  
are	  raised	  to	  the	  status	  of	  being	  “undiscussable	  preferences”	  and	  no	  essentialist	   theory	   is	  off	  
the	  table	  before	  the	  debate	  begins.	  This	  would	  lead	  to	  fewer	  consensuses	  but	  more	  complexity	  
than	  presently	  exists	  within	   corporate	   legal	  discourse,	  helping	   to	   immunize	   the	   law	   from	   the	  
sort	  of	  oversimplifications	  that	  might	  offer	  ease	  of	  comprehension	  at	  the	  risk	  of	  positive	  error.	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3 INDETERMINACY AND BALANCE	  
I.	  INTRODUCTION	  
The	   needs	   of	   markets	   are	   largely	   uncontested.	   They	   include	   the	   need	   for	   scarce	  
resources	  to	  be	  efficiently	  distributed,1	  a	  regulatory	  environment	  that	  secures	  certainty	  for	  
business	  transactions	  over	  time,2	  and	  additional	  advantages	  necessary	  to	  win	  customers	  in	  
a	  competitive	  global	  marketplace.3	  Society’s	  needs	  are	  highly	  contested.	  They	  include,	  at	  a	  
minimum,	   the	   need	   for	   access	   to	   fundamental	   human	   rights.4	   The	   needs	   of	  markets	   and	  
society	  ought	  always	  to	  be	  aligned;	  however,	  in	  practice	  they	  are	  not.5	  This	  article	  assumes	  
that	  striving	  and	  re-­‐striving	  for	  such	  a	  balance	  is	  a	  central	  challenge	  for	  regulators	  today.	  
Furthermore,	  this	  assumption	  is	  a	  foundational	  premise	  from	  which	  this	  article	  is	  built.	  	  
Corporations	  are	  central	  players	  in	  the	  mediation	  of	  tensions	  between	  markets	  and	  
society.6	   Thus,	   it	   stands	   to	   reason	   that	   we	   as	   corporate	   legal	   scholars	   ought	   to	   invite	   a	  
robust	   debate	   that	   encourages	   broad	   discussions	   about	   the	   role	   of	   the	   corporation	   in	  
society	  in	  order	  to	  help	  in	  finding	  and	  re-­‐finding	  the	  “appropriate”7	  balance.	  To	  achieve	  this	  
end,	  we	  must	   be	   constantly	   challenging	   and	   reassessing	   our	   assumptions	   about	   how	   the	  
1 Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 525–26 (1945). 
2 Max Weber wrote, “The modern capitalist enterprise rests primarily on calculation and presupposes a legal 
and administrative system, whose functioning can be rationally predicted, at least in principle, by virtue of its fixed 
general norms, just like the expected performance of a machine.” MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN 
OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY, 1394 (1968). 
3 After a comparative study of a ten important trading nations, Michael Porter concluded that in each case the 
firms that were globally successful enjoyed legal, social, and/or economic conditions in “the home country,” which 
provided a competitive advantage for their industry. MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF 
NATIONS (2d ed. 1998). 
4 The most commonly accepted framework of basic human rights includes, Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 1948); Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; American Convention on 
Human Rights, Nov. 21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3. A more controversial outlier for the more conservative minded might include the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967), 993 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
5 For instance, see generally SURYA DEVA, REGULATING CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS:
HUMANIZING BUSINESS (2012); JERNEJ LETNAR ČERNIČ, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND BUSINESS: CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS (2010); FLORIAN WETTSTEIN, MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF A QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTION 
(2009). 
6 Andreas Georg Scherer, Guido Palazzo & Dorothee Baumann, Global Rules and Private Actors - Towards a 
New Role of the Transnational Corporation in Global Governance, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 505 (2006); Neva Goodwin, 
The Social Impacts of Multinational Corporations: An Outline of the Issues with a Focus on Workers, 
in LEVIATHANS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE NEW GLOBAL HISTORY, 24-28 (Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. 
& Bruce Mazlish eds., 2005); Dennis A. Rondinelli, Transnational Corporations: International Citizens or New 
Sovereigns?, 107 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 391 (2002). 
7 This term (and others) is in quotations because this article sets aside the questions of whether evaluations such 
as “better” are possible in this context. In other words, this article is mindful, and wary, of drawing distinctions 
between good/legitimate forms of governance and bad/illegitimate ones, leaving such attempts at “objective” 
measure to others.  
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law	  ought	  to	  mediate	  corporate	  conflicts.8	  	  Put	  differently,	  we	  need	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  how	  the	  
processes	  of	  socialization	  impact	  our	  norms,	  preferences,	  and	  politics	  as	  academics.9	  	  	  
Today,	   the	  corporation	   is	  generally	  assumed	  to	  be	  a	  nexus-­‐of-­‐contracts.10	   It	   is	  also	  
assumed	   that	   the	   contracts	   that	   bind	   corporate	   constituents	   are	   both	   consensual	   and	  
efficient.11	  Such	  efficiencies	  occur	  because	  legal	  requirements	  upon	  corporate	  governance	  
have	  been	  relaxed,	  and	  relaxed	  legal	  requirements	  allow	  market	  forces	  to	  inspire	  corporate	  
constituents	  to	  use	  their	  ingenuity	  to	  negotiate	  contracts	  in	  their	  own	  best	  interest.12	  What	  
follows	   from	   this	   is	   that	   corporate	   law	   ought	   to	   be	   permissive	   in	   nature,	   rejecting	  
mandatory	  legal	  rules	  as	  generally	  suboptimal.13	  	  
Recent	  corporate	  and	  financial	  scandals	  appear	  to	  challenge	  the	  prudence	  of	  these	  
assumptions,14	  yet	  they	  prevail	  over	  corporate	  legal	  thinking.15	  To	  be	  fair,	  they	  may	  still	  be	  
the	  best	  option	  available,	  and	  conceding	   this,	   this	  article	  ought	  not	   to	  be	  construed	  as	  an	  
attack	   on	   these	   prevailing	   presumptions.	   Rather,	   this	   article	   merely	   suggests	   that	   more	  
self-­‐reflexive	  debates	  about	  the	  “right”	  way	  to	  mediate	  corporate	  conflicts	  will	  improve	  the	  
ways	  we	  think	  about	  and	  discuss	  the	  corporation	  and	  thus,	  it	  is	  assumed,	  will	  improve	  our	  
understanding	  of	  corporate	  governance.	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  we	  accept	  the	  tenuous	  nature	  of	  
the	   choices	   we	   make,	   we	   can	   be	   more	   open-­‐minded	   to	   a	   broader	   spectrum	   of	  
considerations.	   With	   a	   more	   open-­‐minded	   understanding,	   we	   ought	   to	   make	   “better”	  
choices	  about	  how	  corporate	  governance	  ought	  to	  be	  regulated.16	  Such	  a	  critical	  mindset	  is	  
important,	   as	   our	   assumptions	   frame	   how	   corporate	   governance	   is	   conceptualized,	  
8 William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 
407, 464–65 (1988). 
9 PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE
SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 74, 177 (1966). 
10 Bratton, supra note 8, at 458 (arguing that “the nexus of contracts concept places the corporation on a 
foundation of contractual consent”). For an example of a “real adherent,” see STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 30–31 (2008) (Bainbridge’s application of “The Hypothetical 
Bargain Methodology”). 
11 Thomas W. Joo, Theories and Models of Corporate Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A SYNTHESIS
OF THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 157, 170 (H. Kent Baker & Ronald Anderson eds., 2010) (arguing that 
“incorporating efficient-market assumptions, contractarianism makes two claims: that governance is consensual and 
that it is efficient”). 
12 Thomas W. Joo, Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor in Corporations Law, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
779 (2002) (arguing that the contractarian vision of contract is a laissez-faire one, which justifies the assumption that 
“economic relationships are the product of individual free will and rational deliberation, and the law respects them 
for this reason”). For an excellent example of an adherent to this theory, see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 10, at 30–31 
(2008) (Bainbridge’s application of “The Hypothetical Bargain Methodology”). 
13 Joo, supra note 11, at 171. 
14 For examples and analysis, see ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS: THE CORPORATE SCANDAL READER 
(Nancy B. Rapoport, Jeffery D. Van Niel & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2d ed. 2009). However, also consider the wider 
literature on the Credit Crisis of 2008. See SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET
TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010); ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE 
STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES 
(2009). 
15 Joo, supra note 11, at 170. 
16 Id.  
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influencing	  the	  way	  that	  participants	  within	  corporate	  governance	  calculate	  and	  respond	  to	  
problems.17	  
Specifically,	   to	   improve	   the	  processes	  of	  understanding	  how	   to	  mediate	   corporate	  
conflicts,18	   this	   article	   recommends	   focusing	   upon	   the	   indeterminacy	   of	   corporate	   legal	  
theories.	   In	  doing	  so,	   corporate	   legal	   thinking	   “habitualizes”	  being	  critical	  and	  mindful	  of	  
such	   indeterminacies,19	   resulting	   in	   greater	   pluralism,	   since	   no	   corporate	   legal	   theory	  
would	   become	   “heavily	   privileged”	   over	   any	   other,	   allowing	   each	   to	  make	   contributions	  
within	  legal	  thinking.20	  When	  such	  a	  balance	  between	  theories	  exists,	  a	  robust	  debate	  can	  
occur	  where	   no	   ideas	   are	   raised	   to	   the	   status	   of	   “truth”	  while	   other	   theories	   are	   off	   the	  
table	   before	   the	   debate	   begins.21	   This	   would	   lead	   to	   fewer	   consensuses,22	   but	   more	  
complexity	  than	  presently	  exists	  within	  corporate	  legal	  discourse,	  helping	  to	  immunize	  the	  
law	   from	   the	   sort	   of	   oversimplifications	   that	  might	   offer	   “ease	   of	   comprehension”	   at	   the	  
risk	   of	   “positive	   error.”23	   This	   article	   argues	   that	   adding	   such	   complexity	   and	  balance	   to	  
corporate	  legal	  discourse	  would	  be	  “wholesome”	  for	  corporate	  law.24	  
To	  be	  clear,	  this	  article	  does	  not	  reject	  the	  argument	  that	  relaxed	  legal	  requirements	  
lead	   to	   optimal	   corporate	   governance	   results	   over	   time.25	   Rather,	   it	   argues	   that	   the	  
assumptions	   that	   underpin	   this	   argument	   are	   too	   fragile	   to	   assert	   that	   relaxed	   legal	  
requirements	  will	  produce	  the	  assumed	  outcome	  in	  all	  circumstances.26	  Thus,	  such	  fragile	  a	  
priori	   knowledge27	   of	   the	   corporation	  must	   be	   recursively	   subject	   to	   careful	   scrutiny	   in	  
today’s	   fast-­‐changing	   society.	   If	   this	   is	   true,	   then	   no	   single	   theory	   or	  model	   ought	   to	   be	  
treated	  as	  authoritative.	  	  
If	  an	  idea	  “works,”	  then	  that	  is	  the	  best	  we	  can	  hope	  for,	  and	  if	  circumstances	  change	  
and	  what	  worked	  stops	  working,	  then	  we	  had	  better	  figure	  out	  how	  to	  adapt	  so	  that	  theory	  
reflects	  practice	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible.28	  As	  Fred	  Block	  suggests,	   “market	   societies”29	  are	  
17 For the interplay of corporate legal discourse, theory, doctrine, and policy, see Ron Harris, The 
Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality Theories: From German Codification to British 
Political Pluralism and American Big Business, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1421 (2006). For challenges to Harris’s 
position, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Relevance of Corporate Theory to Corporate and Economic Development: 
Comment on The Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality Theories, 63 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1489 (2006). 
18 Bratton, supra note 8, at 464–65. 
19 BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 9, at 74, 177. 
20 Bratton, supra note 8, at 464–65. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 465. 
23 Joo, supra note 11, at 170. 
24 Bratton, supra note 8, at 465. 
25 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 35 (1991). 
26 For arguments supporting this anti-essentialist notion of corporate law, see William W. Bratton, Welfare, 
Dialectic, and Mediation in Corporate Law, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 59, 70 (2005); Bratton, supra note 8. 
27 A priori knowledge is “knowledge that rests on a priori justification. A priori justification is a type of 
epistemic justification that is, in some sense, independent of experience.” Bruce Russell, A Priori Justification and 
Knowledge, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2011), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/.  
28 William James wrote of pragmatism: “Rationalism sticks to logic. . . . Empiricism sticks to the external 
senses. Pragmatism is willing to take anything, to follow either logic or the senses and to count the humblest and 
most personal experiences. She will count mystical experiences if they have practical consequences. . . . Her only 
test of probable truth is what works best in the way of leading us, what fits every part of life best and combines with 
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patchworks	   of	   regulations	  which	   do	   not	   necessarily	   fit	   together	   easily,	   generating	   social	  
systems	   that	   have	   an	   “always	   under	   construction”	   nature.30	   Within	   this	   context,	   it	   is	  
suggested	  that	  embracing	  the	  indeterminacy	  of	  corporate	  theory	  will	  necessarily	  generate	  
a	  more	  responsive	  and	  critical	  discourse	   that,	  over	   time,	  will	   improve	  corporate	   function	  
within	  an	  ever-­‐changing	  global	  marketplace.	  
	  Part	  2	  of	   this	  article	   introduces	  three	  essentialist	   theories	  of	   the	  corporation:	   	   the	  
concession	   theory,	   the	  entity	   theory,	  and	  the	  aggregate	  contractarian	   theory.	  These	   three	  
theories	  have	  always	  been	  relevant	  variables	  when	  considering	  the	  modern	  corporation.31	  
Put	  differently,	  since	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  modern	  publicly	  traded	  corporation,32	  the	  corporation	  
has	  always	  been	  a	  group	  of	  aggregate	  constituents33	  connected	  through	  contract,34	  while	  at	  
the	   same	   time	  being	   an	   entity	  with	   personhood	   that	   only	   exists	   because	   of	   a	   concession	  
made	   by	   the	   state.35	   It	   is	   argued	   that	   each	   of	   these	   three	   theories	   is	   indeterminate.36	  
Indeterminate,	   in	   this	   context,	   means	   that	   these	   essentialist	   theories	   do	   not	   support	   or	  
reject	   any	  position	  with	   corporate	   governance	  until	   combined	  with	   additional	  normative	  
claims.37	  
Parts	   3	   and	   4	   trace	   this	   history	   of	   indeterminacy,	   pulling	   together	   a	   synthesis	   of	  
these	   three	   essentialist	   theories	   of	   the	   corporation	   throughout	   the	   twentieth	   century	   to	  
present.	  They	  offer	   insight	   into	  how	  each	  essentialist	   theory	  has	  been	  used	  to	  rationalize	  
contrasting	   policy	   positions.	   In	   other	   words,	   they	   focus	   on	   how	   each	   of	   the	   essentialist	  
theories	  have	  been	  used	  to	  embed	  a	  prescription	  as	  to	  how	  to	  regulate	  the	  corporation,	  and	  
then	   later,	   how	   that	   same	   theory	   was	   used	   to	   advocate	   for	   a	   policy	   prescription	   that	  
undermines	  the	  original.38	  Thus,	  they	  present	  historical	  examples	  of	  this	  indeterminacy	  in	  
action.	   Specifically,	   this	   article	   explains	   how	   this	   has	   occurred	   in	   the	   use	   of	   both	   the	  
the collectivity of experience’s demands, nothing being omitted.” WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A SERIES OF 
LECTURES BY WILLIAM JAMES, 1906–1907, 40 (2008). 
29 Fred Block uses the term “market society,” which he attributes to Karl Polanyi. Block describes “market 
society” as Polanyi’s conception of a society that is constituted by two opposing movements: “the laissez-fair 
movement to expand the scope of markets, and the protective countermovement that emerges to resist . . . the 
impossible pressures of a self-regulating market system.” Fred Block, Introduction to KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT
TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME xxviii (2d ed. 2001). 
30 Markets and Society: The Life and Thought of Karl Polanyi, Part 5: The Legacy, CANADIAN BROADCASTING
CORPORATION (Posted Aug. 8, 2006, 9:53 pm) (interviewing Fred Block), available at 
http://www.insidethecbc.com/ideas-series-markets-and-society-available-for-download/. 
31 David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 204, 242–51 (1990); see also Joo, supra 
note 11.  
32 For an historical account of the rise of the modern corporation at the end of the 19th century, see Fenner 
Stewart, Jr., The Place of Corporate Lawmaking in American Society, 23 LOYOLA CONSUMER L. REV. 147, 151–55 
(2010). 
33 Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886); see also Joo, supra note 11, at 159. 
34 Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM.
ECON. REV. 777, 783–84 (1972).  
35 For more on the historical roots of the concession theory, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic 
Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1502–05 (1989). 
36 John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 669 (1926). 
37 Id. 
38 See infra notes 60–61, 69–72 & 74–76 and accompanying text. 
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concession	   and	   entity	   theories.	   Part	   4	   ends	   by	   predicting	   how	   the	   prevailing	   aggregate	  
contractarian	  theory	  has	  already	  past	  its	  high-­‐water	  mark,	  pointing	  to	  how	  alternative	  and	  
contrasting	  versions	  of	  it	  may	  emerge.	  This	  history	  of	  legal	  thought	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  
patterns	  of	  how	  we	  manufacture	  knowledge	  about	  the	  corporation	  and	  corporate	  law	  over	  
time.39	  
In	   conclusion,	   the	  article	   reasserts	   that	   embracing	   the	   indeterminacy	  of	   corporate	  
theory	  will	  generate	  the	  sort	  of	  robust	  debate	  that	  we	  as	  corporate	  legal	  scholars	  ought	  to	  
have.	   In	   the	  end,	   the	  article	   leaves	   the	   reader	  with	  a	   simple	  proposal	   for	  conceptualizing	  
the	   corporation:	   	   be	   self-­‐critical	   of	   one’s	   role	   in	   the	   manufacturing	   of	   corporate	   legal	  
knowledge	  and,	  in	  part,	  be	  leery	  of	  accepting	  a	  priori	  knowledge	  as	  fact.	  	  
II. THREE	  ESSENTIALIST	  THEORIES	  OF	  THE	  CORPORATION
AND	  THEIR	  INDETERMINATE	  NATURE	  
The	   thoughts	   of	   John	   Dewey	   explain	   how	   the	   essentialist	   theories	   of	   the	  
corporation40	   are	   indeterminate.	   This	   part	   explains	   his	   position	   and	   then	   evaluates	   its	  
implications,	   before	   disagreeing	   with	   his	   recommendations	   on	   what	   ought	   to	   be	   done	  
about	  this	  indeterminacy.	  Then	  this	  part	  delves	  into	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  three	  essentialist	  
theories	   of	   the	   corporation:	   	   the	   concession	   theory,	   the	   entity	   theory,	   and	   the	   aggregate	  
contractarian	   theory.	   Finally,	   it	   foreshadows	   the	   historical	   narrative	   explored	   in	   Parts	   3	  
and	  4	  by	  briefly	  explaining	  how	  each	  of	  these	  essentialist	  theories	  can	  be	  used	  to	  endorse	  
contradictory	   policy	   prescriptions	   by	   altering	   the	   additional	   normative	   suppositions	  
attached	  to	  the	  essentialist	  theory	  in	  question.	  
It	   may	   not	   be	   accurate	   to	   call	   Dewey	   a	   realist,	   but	   he	   was	   most	   definitely	   an	  
antiformalist,	  who	  was	   very	   sympathetic	   to	   the	   realist	  movement	   against	   formalism	   that	  
was	  occurring	  in	  a	  number	  of	  disciplines,	  including	  law,41	  in	  the	  early	  part	  of	  the	  twentieth	  
century.42	  He	  was	  acutely	  aware	  that	  social	  modeling	  and	  formal	  reasoning	  easily	  became	  
safe	  havens	  for	  undisclosed	  normative	  agendas	  separate	  from	  the	  reasoning	  itself.43	  	  
In	   1926,	   Dewey	   published	   one	   of	   the	   most	   important	   articles	   that	   the	   Yale	   Law	  
Review	   ever	  printed	  on	   corporate	   theory.44	   In	   the	  article,	  Dewey	  expressed	   concern	  over	  
how	  a	  number	  of	  notions	  about	  the	  “inherent	  and	  essential	  attributes”	  of	  the	  corporation	  
39 For the interplay of corporate legal discourse, theory, doctrine and policy, see Harris, supra note 17. For 
challenges to Harris’s position, see Mitchell, supra note 17. See also BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 9, at 74,
177. 
40 For the purpose of this article, essentialist theories of the corporation are models of the corporation that assert 
it has a set of characteristics that all corporations must possess. There will be three considered: the concession 
theory, the entity theory, and the aggregate contractarian theory. These theories purport to be determinative for 
particular normative positions. However, if Dewey’s anti-essentialist theory of corporate law is correct, then this is 
not the case. See Dewey, supra note 36, at 669. 
41 See generally OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE PATH OF THE LAW (2011); WILLIAM W. FISHER III, MORTON J.
HORWITZ & THOMAS A. REED, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 4 (1993); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and 
the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 816 (1935); Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13
CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 
POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923). 
42 MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM (1976). 
43 JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE 422–27 (Dover Publications 1958) (1925).  
44 Dewey, supra note 36. 
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had	   been	   “shov[ed]	  .	  .	  .	  under	   the	   legal	   idea”	   of	   the	   corporation,	   leading	   to	   “a	   confused	  
intermixture.”45	   In	   fact,	  he	   insisted	  that	  “there	  [was]	  no	  clear-­‐cut	   line,	   logical	  or	  practical,	  
through	  the	  different	  theories”	  and	  that	  “[e]ach	  theory	  [had]	  been	  used	  to	  serve	  the	  same	  
ends,	   and	   each	   [had]	   been	   used	   to	   serve	   opposing	   ends.”46	   He	   argued	   that	   since	   these	  
essentialist	   theories	   were	   indeterminate,	   legal	   thinkers	   must	   learn	   to	   assess	   critically	  
whether	   legal	   assumptions	   attached	   to	   these	   theories	   reflected	   functional	   reality	   of	   the	  
corporation.47	  	  
By	   identifying	   such	   legal	   assumptions	   and	   pragmatically	   assessing	   their	   merit,	  
Dewey	   asserted	   that	   the	   law	   could	   better	   address	   corporate	   legal	   problems.48	   Put	  
differently,	  Dewey’s	   solution	  was	  not	   to	   take	  essentialist	   theories	   too	  seriously	  until	   “the	  
concrete	  facts	  and	  relations	  involved	  [had]	  been	  faced	  and	  stated	  on	  their	  own	  account”	  49	  
in	  order	  to	  forge	  direct	  connections	  between	  legal	  reasoning	  and	  the	  facts.50	  The	  weakness	  
of	   Dewey’s	   suggestion	   is	   that	   by	   discounting	   essentialist	   theories	   when	   mediating	  
corporate	   legal	   conflicts,	   a	   normative	   void	   can	   emerge,	   which	   might	   tempt	   the	   less	  
pragmatically	  minded	  to	  fill	  the	  void,	  potentially	  compromising	  the	  problem	  solving	  Dewey	  
had	  envisioned	  for	  corporate	  legal	  thought.51	  	  
This	  article	  agrees	  with	  Dewey’s	  observations	  about	  the	  potentially	  negative	  impact	  
of	   essentialist	   theories	  of	   the	   corporation,	  but	   it	   disagrees	  with	  his	   solution.	  Rather	   than	  
largely	  disregarding	  essentialist	  theories	  as	  Dewey	  recommended,52	  this	  article	  advocates	  
focusing	   primarily	   upon	   the	   indeterminacy	   of	   these	   essentialist	   theories.53	   Such	  
methodology	  defends	   against	   the	  meritless	  privileging	  of	   any	  one	   theory	  over	   any	  other,	  
tearing	  down	  monopolies	  of	  thought,	  and	  creating	  more	  balance	  between	  competing	  ideas	  
and	   interests.	   Corporate	   legal	   debates	   would	   then	   become	   less	   shielded	   from	   the	  
complexity	   of	   governance	   and	  more	   prepared	   to	   reject	   the	   sort	   of	   oversimplifications	   of	  
corporate	  function	  that	  increase	  the	  risk	  of	  “positive	  error”54	  within	  corporate	  governance.	  
This	  article	  next	  considers	  each	  of	  these	  essentialist	  theories:	  	  the	  concession	  theory,	  
the	   entity	   theory,	   and	   the	   aggregate	   contractarian	   theory.	   The	   concession	   theory	   asserts	  
that	   corporations	   are	   merely	   creatures	   of	   statute.55	   The	   classic	   articulation	   of	   the	  
concession	  theory	  was	  proffered	  by	  William	  Blackstone	  in	  his	  Commentaries	  on	  the	  Laws	  of	  
England.56	  He	  argued	  that	  for	  a	  corporation	  to	  exist,	  the	  monarch’s	  consent	  was	  “absolutely	  
45 Id.  
46 Id. at 669. 
47 Id. at 657–58.  
48 Id. at 673. 
49 Id. at 673. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. 
52 Id.  
53 Bratton, supra note 8, at 464–65. 
54 Id. at 465. 
55 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819). For more on the historical roots of 
the concession theory, see Bratton, supra note 35, at 1502–05. 
56 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 460 (1979). 
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necessary.”57	  Today,	  this	  observation	  is	  still	  technically	  correct:	  government	  authority	  must	  
grant	   permission	   for	   the	   incorporation	   of	   a	   business.	   However,	   since	   the	   dawn	   of	   the	  
twentieth	   century,	   corporate	   law	   has	   made	   the	   approval	   of	   this	   granting	   process	  
guaranteed	  as	  long	  as	  the	  rules	  of	  incorporation	  are	  not	  violated.58	  In	  other	  words,	  instead	  
of	   the	   legislature	   creating	   each	   corporation	   through	   legislation,	   corporations	   could	   be	  
created	   merely	   through	   compliance	   with	   a	   general	   enabling	   statue.	   Incorporation	   now	  
occurs	   automatically	   as	   long	   as	   the	   appropriate	   information	   and	   fees	   are	   submitted	   in	  
accordance	  with	  regulatory	  requirements.59	  	  
That	   said,	   such	   legislative	   reforms	   do	   not	   diminish	   the	   basic	   claim	   that	   the	  
corporation	  is	  a	  creature	  of	  statute.	  This	  is	  a	  characteristic	  that	  all	  corporations	  possess.	  It	  
is	  an	  essential	  consideration.	  It	  is	  also	  indeterminate	  until	  additional	  normative	  claims	  are	  
introduced.	   For	   instance,	   when	   the	   additional	   normative	   claim	   is	   introduced	   that	  
incorporations	   are	   granted	   in	   order	   to	   help	   ensure	   society’s	   economic	   welfare,60	   the	  
concession	   theory	   suggests	   that	   whether	   or	   not	   a	   corporation	   meets	   this	   standard	   will	  
dictate	   if	   the	   state	   will	   intervene.	   However,	   when	   the	   additional	   normative	   claim	   is	  
introduced	   that	   “the	   state	  provides	   the	   corporate	   form…	  solely	   as	   a	  means	  of	   facilitating	  
private	  ordering	  amongst	  people,”61	  then	  the	  concession	  theory	  suggests	  something	  much	  
different.	  In	  sum,	  incorporation	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  corporation,	  but	  what	  follows	  from	  this	  
acknowledgement	  is	  indeterminate.	  	  	  
The	   entity	   theory	   asserts	   that	   the	   corporation	   is	   something	   that	   exists	   beyond	   its	  
aggregate	  parts.62	  The	  clearest	  case	  of	  this	  is	  how	  the	  law	  treats	  the	  corporation.	  Examples	  
of	  this	   include:	   	   judicial	  enforcement	  of	   limited	  liability,63	   judicial	  reluctance	  to	  pierce	  the	  
corporate	   veil,64	   the	   general	   refusal	   of	   courts	   to	   burden	   corporations	   with	   pre-­‐
incorporation	   contractual	   obligations	   made	   by	   its	   promoters,65	   and	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	  
57 Id.
58 For legislative treatment of this issue, see, for example, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (West 2011) (requiring 
only the filing of a certificate of incorporation with the Division of Corporations in the Department of State); 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§2.01, 2.03 (2002); N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. VIII, § 1. 
59 Of course, this is an oversimplification of the job that lawyers must undertake to organize the governance 
structure of a corporation in a manner that best suits their client’s needs. See CHARLES R. T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B.
THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 8–19 (6th ed. 2010).  
60 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 971 (2010) (Stevens. J., dissenting) (arguing that “[u]nlike other 
interest groups, business corporations have been ‘effectively delegated responsibility for ensuring society’s 
economic welfare’; they inescapably structure the life of every citizen”). 
61 Stephen Bainbridge, Citizens United v. FEC: Stevens’ Pernicious Version of the Concession Theory, (Jan. 1, 
2010), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/01/citizens-united-v-fec-stevens-
pernicious-version-of-the-concession-theory.html. 
62 George F. Canfield, The Scope and Limits of the Corporate Entity Theory, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 128 (1917). 
63 Consider the emergence of limited liability companies. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 59, at 535–
38; see also Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286 (Del. 1999). 
64 See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 59, at 608–11. In contractual situations, see Consumer’s Co-op v. 
Olsen 419 N.W.2d 211 (Wis. 1988); K. C. Roofing Ctr. v. On Top Roofing, Inc. 807 S.W.2d 545 (Miss. 1991). In 
torts situations, see W. Rock Co. v. Davis 432 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. 1968); Baatz v. Arrow Bar 452 N.W.2d 138 (S.D. 
1990). 
65 See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 59, at 658–59; see also RKO-Stanley Warner Theatres, Inc. v. 
Granziano 355 A.2d 830 (Pa. 1976). 
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corporation	   to	   enter	   into	   contracts,66	   hire	   workers,67	   and	   acquire	   property.68	   In	   each	   of	  
these	   legal	   examples,	   the	   law	   treats	   the	   corporation	  as	   though	   it	  was	   separate	   from,	  and	  
something	   other	   than,	   the	   sum	   of	   its	   aggregate	   parts.	   This	   is	   a	   characteristic	   that	   all	  
corporations	  possess;	   it	   is	  an	  essential	  consideration.	  And	  like	  the	  concession	  theory,	   it	   is	  
also	   indeterminate	   until	   additional	   normative	   claims	   are	   introduced.	   For	   instance,	   the	  
entity	   theory	   could	   regard	   the	   corporation	   as	   the	   private	   property	   of	   shareholders,69	  
justifying	  a	  shareholder	  primacy	  perspective,70	  or	  it	  could	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  social	  corpus	  that	  
is	  separate	  from	  its	  shareholders,71	  justifying	  a	  stakeholder	  perspective.72	  	  	  
Finally,	  the	  aggregate	  contractarian	  theory	  argues	  that	  the	  corporation	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  
the	  contractual	  obligations	  that	  each	  of	  its	  constituents	  (labor,	  management,	  shareholders,	  
creditors,	  the	  community-­‐at-­‐large,	  etcetera)	  owe	  to	  each	  of	  its	  other	  constituents.73	  Again,	  
all	   corporations	   possess	   this	   characteristic.	   Again,	   it	   is	   an	   essential	   consideration.	   And	  
again,	   it	   is	   also	   indeterminate	   until	   additional	   normative	   claims	   are	   introduced.	   For	  
instance,	  the	  aggregate	  contractarian	  theory	  could	  stand	  as	  a	  barrier	  to	  state	  intervention,	  
based	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   contracting	   is	   consensual	   and	   efficient,74	   or	   it	   could	  
transcend	  the	  notions	  of	  market/state	  and	  public/private75	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  
contracting	  is	  a	  complex,	  multi-­‐polar	  governance	  practice,	  which	  animates	  and	  transcends	  
“the	   contract.”76	   This	   revitalization	   of	   relational	   contract	   theory	   invites	   one	   to	   take	  
seriously	   “the	   larger	   context	   and	   framework	   within	   which	   someone	   enter[s]	   into	   and	  
assume[s]	  a	  particular	  contracting	  position.”77	  
These	  three	  theories	  represent	  dimensions	  of	  the	  corporation	  that	  ought	  to	  be	  taken	  
into	   consideration	   when	   mediating	   corporate	   conflicts,	   because	   they	   are	   essential	  
components	   to	  a	   complete	  understanding	  of	   the	  modern	  corporation.	  Furthermore,	  all	  of	  
66 Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Developments of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 
221 (1985) (quoting GERARD CARL HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 166 (1918)). 
67 Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 536 (1922) (holding that corporations have a right “to 
enter into relations of employment with individuals” subject to the law creating the corporation). 
68 Jones v. N.Y. Guar. & Indem. Co., 101 U.S. 622 (1879). 
69 A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932) 
[hereinafter Berle, Jr., A Note]; A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 
(1931) [hereinafter Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers]. 
70 Id. 
71 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1153 (1932). 
72 Id. 
73 Id.; see also Michael C. Jensen & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: 
Applications of Agency Theory, in A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS, AND
ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 136, 136 (Michael C. Jensen ed., 2000). 
74 Joo, supra note 12, at 800 (arguing that the contractarian vision of contract is a laissez-faire one, which 
justifies the assumption that “economic relationships are the product of individual free will and rational deliberation, 
and the law respects them for this reason”); see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 10, at 30–31 (Bainbridge’s application 
of “The Hypothetical Bargain Methodology”). 
75 Peer Zumbansen, Rethinking the Nature of the Firm: The Corporation as a Governance Object, 32 SEATTLE.
U. L. REV. 1469, 1496 (2012). 
76 Id. at 1490. 
77 Id. at 1493. 
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these	   theories	   are	   indeterminate,	  meaning	   that	   they	   could	  be	  used	   as	   a	   platform	   to	   take	  
either	   side	   of	   any	   corporate	   governance	   debate.	   Accordingly,	   each	   of	   the	   theories	   could	  
support	   or	   reject	   any	   central	   issue	  within	   corporate	   governance.78	   In	   other	  words,	   these	  
essentialist	  theories	  do	  not	  bias	  one	  normative	  claim	  over	  another.	  For	  instance,	  aggregate	  
contractarian	  theory	  does	  not	  inherently	  support	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  corporation	  is	  private,	  
that	  default	  rules	  are	  superior	  to	  mandatory	  rules,	   that	  efficiency	   is	  more	   important	  than	  
fairness,	  that	  the	  law	  should	  focus	  on	  process	  and	  leave	  substance	  to	  corporate	  governance,	  
and	   that	   reputational	   enforcement	   is	   better	   for	   all	   concerned	   than	   state	   enforcement.	  
That	  said,	  certain	  normative	  preferences	   tend	  to	  attach	   to	  each	   theory	  at	  different	  
times	  in	  history.79	  For	  instance,	  Morton	  Horwitz	  rejected	  Dewey’s	  indeterminacy	  argument,	  
in	   part,	   when	   he	   used	   a	   critical	   legal	   history	   analysis	   to	   explain	   how	   the	   entity	   theory	  
became	   associated	   with	   the	   private	   nature	   of	   the	   corporation.	   He	   asserted	   that	  
conservative	   interests	   used	   the	   entity	   theory	   in	   a	   determinate	   way	   in	   order	   to	   reject	  
governmental	   intervention.80	   Thus,	  Horwitz	   claimed	   that	   the	   entity	   theory	  was	   a	   private	  
theory	  of	  the	  corporation.	  	  
David	  Millon	  qualified	  Horwitz’s	  argument	  by	  illustrating	  that	  the	  entity	  theory	  was	  
later	   used	   to	   support	   the	   public	   nature	   of	   the	   corporation.81	   By	   highlighting	   the	  
indeterminacy	  of	  the	  entity	  theory,	  Millon	  did	  not	  however	  diminish	  Hortwitz’s	  argument	  
that	  “the	  rise	  of	  a	  natural	  entity	  theory	  of	  the	  corporation	  was	  a	  major	  factor	  in	  legitimating	  
big	  business,”82	  because,	  although	  theories	  may	  be	  inherently	  indeterminate,	  they	  become	  
less	   indeterminate	   when	   studied	   within	   their	   historical	   contexts.	   Put	   differently,	  
indeterminate	   theory	   can	   be	   used	   in	   a	   determinate	   manner	   when	   additional	   normative	  
claims	   are	   imported.	   Horwitz	   asserted,	   “[W]hen	   abstract	   concepts	   are	   used	   in	   specific	  
historical	   contexts,	   they	   do	   acquire	   more	   limited	   meanings	   and	   more	   specific	  
argumentative	  functions.	  In	  particular	  contexts,	  the	  choice	  of	  one	  theory	  over	  another	  may	  
not	   be	   random	   or	   accidental	   because	   history	   and	   usage	   have	   limited	   their	   deepest	  
meanings	  and	  applications.”83	  
In	  sum,	  the	  concession,	  entity	  and	  aggregate	  contractual	  theories	  are	  all	  essential	  to	  
an	  understanding	  of	  what	   the	  corporation	   is.	  Each	  of	   these	   theories	   is	   indeterminate	  and	  
can	   be	   used	   to	   justify	   or	   reject	   any	   position	   within	   corporate	   governance.	   To	   build	   an	  
argument	   for	   or	   against	   any	   position,	   additional	   normative	   claims	   need	   to	   be	   imported.	  
These	   claims	   are	   not	   inherently	   connected	   to	   the	   essentialist	   theory.	   Finally,	   examining	  
these	   theories	   within	   their	   specific	   historical	   contexts	   helps	   to	   expose	   how	   additional	  
normative	  claims	  are	  imported	  to	  these	  essentialist	  theories	  in	  order	  to	  create	  safe	  havens	  
for	   undisclosed	   normative	   agendas	   separate	   from	   the	   theories	   themselves.	  
78 For a more exhaustive list of debates within corporate governance and how they play out in the American 
legal context, see Bratton, supra note 35. 
79 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY, 1780–
1960, 68 (1992); Horwitz, supra note 66, at 204–06. 
80 HORWITZ, supra note 79, at 68; Horwitz, supra note 66, at 204–06. 
81 Millon, supra note 31, at 204, 242–51; Dewey, supra note 36, at 669. 
82 HORWITZ, supra note 79, at 68. 
83 Id.  
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III.	  THE	  CONCESSION	  AND	  ENTITY	  THEORIES	  -­‐	  A	  BRIEF	  HISTORY	  
	  
A.	  The	  Concession	  Theory	  
The	   concession	   theory	   was	   quite	   compelling	   in	   the	   early	   part	   of	   the	   nineteenth	  
century	  when	  corporations	  were	  created	  exclusively	  through	  the	  legislative	  process.84	  The	  
legislation	  in	  question	  would	  prescribe	  the	  corporate	  powers	  and	  purpose,85	  which	  would	  
almost	  always	  be	  for	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  the	  public	  interest.86	  Corporations	  had	  no	  right	  to	  
act	   outside	   of	   these	   legislated	   boundaries,	   and	   they	   bore	   only	   some	   resemblance	   in	  
function	  to	  the	  modern	  corporation.87	  	  
As	  early	  as	  1819,	  the	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  concession	  theory	  can	  be	  observed	  within	  
American	   case	   law.88	   In	   Trustees	   of	   Dartmouth	   College	   v.	   Woodward,	   the	   United	   States	  
Supreme	   Court	   rejected	   the	   argument	   that	   corporations	   were	   created	   by	   the	   unilateral	  
legislative	   act	   of	   the	   state	   and	   endorsed	   the	   argument	   that	   a	   corporate	   charter	   was	   a	  
bilateral	   contract	   between	   the	   state	   and	   the	   incorporator.89	   Put	   differently,	   instead	   of	  
accepting	   Blackstone’s	   more	   traditional	   view	   of	   a	   unilateral	   sovereign	   authority	   over	  
incorporation,90	   this	   process	   was	   regarded	   as	   a	   contractual	   relationship.91	   The	   state	  
granted	   the	   power	   and	   privilege	   to	   operate	   as	   a	   corporation,	   and	   the	   incorporator	  
promised	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  objectives	  for	  which	  corporation	  was	  created.92	  Thus,	  the	  court	  
held	  that	  the	  power	  of	  the	  state	  to	  either	  revoke	  incorporation	  or	  modify	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  
corporate	  charter	  was	  quite	  limited.93	  
The	  case	   that	  marked	  the	  demise	  of	   the	  concession	  theory,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  death	  of	  
the	  public	  corporation	  within	  American	  legal	  thinking	  and	  practice,	  was	  Santa	  Clara	  County	  
v.	   Southern	   Pacific	   Railroad	   Company.94	   Up	   until	   Morton	   J.	   Horowitz	   wrote	   his	  
                                                
84 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) (“A corporation is an artificial 
being…existing only in contemplation of law.” (emphasis added)); Cassatt v. Mitchell Coal & Coke Co., 150 F. 32, 
44 (3d Cir. 1907) (“[A corporation] is a creature of the state.”); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limits on 
Corporate Activity—Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 
933, 935 n.3 (1952); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343, 343 (1947).  
85 Dartmouth, 17 U.S. at 636 (“Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the 
charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are 
supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created.”); see also Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 
(13 Pet.) 519, 584 (1839); Bank of U.S. v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 68 (1827); Head & Amory v. 
Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 127, 162 (1804). 
86 See Dartmouth, 17 U.S. at 637 (“The objects for which a corporation is created…are deemed beneficial to the 
country; and this benefit constitutes the consideration, and in most cases, the sole consideration of the grant.”). 
87 See THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 688 (Paul Lagasse ed., 6th ed. 2000). 
88 See Dartmouth, 17 U.S. at 518. 
89 Id.  
90 See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
91 Dartmouth, 17 U.S. at 658–59. 
92 Id.  
93 Id.  
94 Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886); see also Horwitz, supra note 66. 
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determinative	  article	  on	  the	  case,95	  it	  was	  conventionally	  understood	  that	  the	  Santa	  Clara	  
Court	  granted	  the	  corporation	  Fourteenth	  Amendment	  rights	  because	  Justice	  Field,	  writing	  
for	   the	   majority,	   adopted	   the	   entity	   theory.	   96	   Horowitz	   considered	   the	   theoretical	  
deliberations	   at	   the	   time,	   and	   then	   argued	   that	   it	  was	  more	   likely	   that	   Justice	   Field	  was	  
following	   an	   early	   prototype	   of	   the	   aggregate	   theory	   of	   the	   corporation,	   which	   asserted	  
that	  it	  could	  be	  treated	  much	  like	  a	  partnership.97	  	  
This	  point	  of	  technical	  clarity	  is	  not	  as	  important	  as	  Horowitz’s	  argument	  about	  the	  
significance	  of	   the	   case.	  His	   argument	  proceeded	   to	   contextualize	  Santa	  Clara	  within	   the	  
larger	   shift	   in	   corporate	   legal	   theory	   and	   practice	   to	   privatize	   corporate	   power	   at	   that	  
time.98	  Later,	  David	  Millon	  wrote	   that	   the	  development	  of	   corporate	   theory	  and	  doctrine	  
was	   a	  more	   complicated	  matter	   than	  Horwitz’s	   critical	   narrative	   suggested;	   in	  particular	  
Millon	   suggested	   that	   the	   theory	   at	   the	   time	   was	   employed	   not	   only	   to	   advocate	   for	   a	  
private	  conception	  of	  the	  corporation,	  as	  Horwitz’s	  critique	  might	  suggest,	  but	  also	  a	  public	  
one.99	  	  That	  said,	  Millon	  himself	  also	  asserted	  that	  this	  case	  was	  a	  watershed	  moment	  in	  the	  
shift	  toward	  protection	  of	  corporate	  power	  from	  state	  interventions.100	  	  
There	  were	  a	  series	  of	  corporate	  law	  reforms	  immediately	  after	  Santa	  Clara,	  which	  
contributed	   to	   this	   turn	   to	   private	   theories	   of	   the	   corporation.	   Starting	   in	   1888,	   states	  
began	   to	   allow	   business	   people	   to	   acquire	   incorporation	   through	   an	   administrative	  
process,	   rather	   than	   a	   legislative	   one.101	   This	   made	   incorporation	   more	   or	   less	  
automatic.102	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  ultra	  vires	  doctrine103	  was	  largely	  dismantled.104	  States	  
also	   legislated	   the	   right	   for	   corporations	   to	   possess	   all	   of	   the	   freedoms	   of	   a	   natural	  
businessperson.105	  Other	  corporate	  law	  reforms	  that	  were	  enacted	  at	  this	  time	  granted	  the	  
corporation	   the	   capacity	   to	   buy	   and	   sell	   shares	   of	   other	   corporations.106	   The	   corporate	  
form	   could	   now	   become	   a	   holding	   company	   with	   many	   new	   powers	   and	   potentials.107	  
These	   new	   corporate	   holding	   companies	   created	   the	   ability	   to	   construct	   complex	   and	  
opaque	  ownership	  structures.	  Each	  of	  these	  chipped	  away	  at	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  corporation	  
was	  merely	  a	  creature	  of	  government	  concession,	  which	  resulted	  in	  the	  denial	  of	  its	  public	  
dimension.	  
Upon	  reflection,	  if	  one	  accepts	  that	  all	  essentialist	  theories	  ought	  to	  be	  taken	  equally	  
seriously	  because	   they	  are	  all	  necessary	  components	   to	  a	   comprehensive	  appreciation	  of	  
                                                
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 174, 178.  
97 Id. at 182, 204.  
98 Id. at 204–06. 
99 Millon, supra note 31, at 204, 242–51. 
100 Id. at 213. 
101 See DAVID SCIULLI, CORPORATIONS VS. THE COURT: PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC INTERESTS 89–91 (1999); 
WILLIAM G. ROY, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION IN AMERICA 152–53 
(1997). 
102 O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 59, at 162–63; see also supra note 58. 
103 In this context, the ultra vires doctrine forbids a corporation from acting beyond the scope of powers granted 
to it. Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Proposed Revision of Ultra-Vires Doctrine, 13 A.B.A.J. 323 (1927). 
104 Millon, supra note 31. 
105 Horwitz, supra note 66, at 186–88. 
106 Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 249, 265 
(1976). 
107 For more on the rise of holding companies, see Fred Freedland, History of Holding Company Legislation in 
New York State: Some Doubts as to the “New Jersey First” Tradition, 24 FORDHAM L. REV. 369 (1955). 
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the	   modern	   corporation,	   then	   it	   is	   unfortunate	   that	   American	   legal	   scholarship	   largely	  
rejects	  the	  concession	  theory	  today.	  The	  prevailing	  attitude	  toward	  the	  concession	  theory	  
is	  reflected	  in	  the	  following	  passage	  from	  Stephen	  Bainbridge:	  
It	  has	  been	  over	  half-­‐a-­‐century	  since	  corporate	   legal	   theory,	  of	  any	  political	  
or	   economic	   stripe,	   took	   the	   concession	   theory	   seriously.	   In	   particular,	  
concession	  theory	  is	  plainly	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  contractarian	  model	  of	  the	  
firm,	  which	  treats	  corporate	  law	  as	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  set	  of	  standard	  form	  
contract	  terms	  provided	  by	  the	  state	  to	  facilitate	  private	  ordering.	  The	  state	  
provides	  the	  corporate	  form	  not	  so	  the	  corporation	  can	  ensure	  social	  welfare,	  
but	  solely	  as	  a	  means	  of	  facilitating	  private	  ordering	  amongst	  people.108	  
It	   is	   significant	   to	  note	   that	  Bainbridge’s	   statement	  demonstrates	  much	  of	  what	   is	  
problematic	   about	   corporate	   law	   from	   Dewey’s	   perspective.	   If	   Dewey	   is	   right,	   then	   it	  
follows	  that	  the	  “contractarian	  model”	  [aggregate	  contractarian	  theory]	  and	  the	  concession	  
theory	  can	  be	  “used	  to	  serve	  the	  same	  ends,”	  or	  “to	  serve	  opposing	  ends;”109	  thus,	  they	  can	  
be	  consistent	  or	  inconsistent	  with	  each	  other.	  In	  other	  words,	  both	  essentialist	  theories	  are	  
indeterminate.	  So	  how	  can	   they	  be	   “plainly	   inconsistent?”	   In	  actuality,	  Bainbridge	  proves	  
that	   they	   can	   be	   consistent	   in	   the	   last	   sentence	   of	   the	   passage:	   	   “The	   state	   provides	   the	  
corporate	  form	  not	  so	  the	  corporation	  can	  ensure	  social	  welfare,	  but	  solely	  as	  a	  means	  of	  
facilitating	  private	  ordering	  amongst	  people.”110	  Bainbridge	  is	  employing	  a	  variation	  of	  the	  
concession	  theory	  here	  that	  states:	  at	  the	  point	  of	  incorporation	  the	  state	  does	  not	  impose	  
an	  obligation	  upon	  the	  corporation	  to	  ensure	  social	  welfare,	  but	  merely	  offers	  a	  means	  to	  
facilitate	   private	   ordering	   without	   a	   social	   welfare	   obligation.	   This	   is	   a	   version	   of	   the	  
concession	   theory,	   one	   he	   takes	   seriously,	   and	   it	   is	   consistent	   with	   his	   version	   of	   the	  
aggregate	  contractarian	  theory.	  
B.	  The	  Entity	  Theory	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  from	  the	  outset	  that	  there	  can	  be	  a	  distinction	  drawn	  between	  
the	   corporation	   as	   an	   artificial	   entity	   and	   the	   corporation	   as	   a	   natural	   entity.111	   For	   the	  
purpose	   of	   this	   article,	   the	   artificial	   entity	   theory	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   version	   of	   the	  
concession	  theory,	  based	  on	  the	  reasoning	  that	  the	  artificial	  entity	  theory	  concentrates	  on	  
the	   concession	   and	   the	   consequences	   of	   that	   concession.112	   This	   version	   claims	   that	   the	  
corporation	  is	  created	  by	  incorporation,	  and	  thus	  it	  is	  an	  artificial	  construction	  of	  the	  state.	  
By	   contrast,	   the	   natural	   entity	   theory	   [hereinafter	   just	   “entity	   theory”]	   suggests	   that	   the	  
corporation	   is	  a	   “‘natural’	  phenomenon”	   that	   is	   something	  more	   than	  merely	  an	  artificial	  
                                                
108 Bainbridge, supra note 61. 
109 Dewey, supra note 36, at 669. 
110 Bainbridge, supra note 61. 
111 Millon, supra note 31, at 211. 
112 Id.; Joo, supra note 11, at 158. 
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creation	  of	  the	  state.113	  	  
Millon	  explains	  that	  prior	  to	  the	  twentieth	  century	  the	  corporation	  was	  considered	  
to	  be	  an	  artificial	  entity	  and	  it	  was	  not	  until	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  that	  the	  
entity	  theory	  started	  to	  gain	  popularity.114	  In	  the	  American	  context,	  the	  entity	  theory	  was	  
first	  used	  as	  a	  vehicle	  to	  make	  the	  normative	  claim	  that	  “the	  corporation	  [was]	  the	  creation	  
of	  private	  initiative	  rather	  than	  state	  power.”115	  As	  Millon	  explains:	  
The	  triumph	  of	  the	  new	  theory	  therefore	  signaled	  a	  willingness	  to	  dispense	  
with	   the	   use	   of	   corporate	   law	   as	   a	   regulatory	   tool	   designed	   to	   address	   the	  
special	  social	  and	  economic	  problems	  that	  Americans	  saw	  as	  stemming	  from	  
the	   rise	   of	   the	   business	   corporation.	   Theory	   instead	   tended	   to	   assimilate	  
corporate	   persons	   to	   the	   status	   of	   natural	   persons,	   eliminating	   the	   many	  
special	   limitations	   on	   corporate	   freedom	   of	   action	   that	   the	   states	   had	  
imposed	   in	   the	  past.	  With	   this	   change	   in	   theory	   came	  a	  new	  willingness	   to	  
treat	   corporate	   activity	   as	   fundamentally	   private	   in	   nature,	   differing	   in	   no	  
important	  ways	  from	  ordinary	  individual	  commercial	  activities	  and	  therefore	  
free	  from	  special	  legal	  regulations	  designed	  to	  protect	  public	  welfare.116	  
Millon’s	   explanation	   is	   an	   example	   of	   Horwitz’s	   “history	   and	   usage”	   analysis,117	   which	  
acknowledges	  that	  the	  “deep[er]	  meanings	  and	  applications”	  of	  an	  essentialist	  theory	  may	  
be	   limited	  by	   the	  social	   context	   in	  which	   it	   is	  used.118	  Although	   this	  version	  of	   the	  entity	  
theory	   was	   used	   to	   block	   state	   intervention	   in	   corporate	   affairs,119	   much	   like	   how	   the	  
aggregate	   contactarian	   theory	   is	   used	   today,120	   in	   time,	   a	   new	   version	   emerged	   that	  
changed	   this	   usage.	   This	   new	   version	   of	   the	   entity	   theory	   was	   used	   to	   attempt	   to	   tie	  
corporate	  managers	  to	  a	  social	  responsibility	  agenda,	  as	  the	  works	  of	  scholars	  such	  as	  Adolf	  
A.	  Berle121	  and	  E.	  Merrick	  Dodd122	  demonstrate.	  	  
It	   is	   important	   to	  note	   that	  European	  scholars	  have	  had	  a	  much	  richer	   intellectual	  
history	   of	   contemplating	   the	   corporate	   form	   as	   a	   natural	   entity.123	   Generally,	   these	  
European	   scholars	   advanced	   entity	   theories,	   which	   asserted	   that	   there	   was	   something	  
essentially	   natural	   about	   how	   individuals	   congregated	   in	   order	   to	   accomplish	   tasks	   and	  
                                                
113 Id. at 161. 
114 Millon, supra note 31, at 211. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 213. 
117 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. For more commentary on Horwitz’s “history and usage” analysis, 
see Joo, supra note 11, at 171.  
118 HORWITZ, supra note 79, at 68. 
119 Millon, supra note 31, at 213. 
120 Joo, supra note 11, at 164–70. Some might protest this point arguing that the aggregate contractarian model 
has already been exposed as indeterminate. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999). That said, although this is evitable, it is still primarily being used at this 
time as a tool to block state intervention, like the entity theory was used at the turn of the twentieth century. 
121 Berle, Jr., A Note, supra note 69; Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers, supra note 69. 
122 Dodd, supra note 71.  
123 For instance, Otto Gierke drew upon the medieval understanding of the corporation (universitas) as the 
collection of people that formed a “mystical body.” See OTTO GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE 
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that	  the	  power	  and	  complexity	  that	  emanated	  from	  such	  organization	  ought	  to	  be	  studied	  
at	  a	  social	  rather	  than	  an	  individual	  level.124	  Such	  theories	  took	  very	  seriously	  the	  effects	  of	  
the	  social	  dimensions	  of	  group	  activity.	  For	  instance,	  Marjatta	  Maula	  is	  taking	  the	  German	  
theory	   of	   the	   corporation	   as	   a	   social	   system125	   in	   a	   promising	   direction,	   offering	   an	  
accessible	   theory	   of	   “the	  model	   of	   living	   organizations,	   which	   explains	   the	   processes	   or	  
learning	  and	  renewal	  .	  .	  .	  that	  are	  based	  on	  continuous	  co-­‐evolution	  and	  self-­‐production	  of	  
an	  organization.”126	  	  
American	  corporate	  legal	  scholars	  never	  attempted	  to	  grapple	  as	  deeply	  with	  these	  
more	   social	   implications	   of	   the	   entity	   theory.	   This	   could	   be	   because,	   as	   Thomas	   Joo	  
suggests,	  “[t]he	  general	  emphasis	  on	  groups	  as	  entities	  may	  have	  been	  too	  reminiscent	  of	  
socialism	   and	   communism	   and	   too	   alien	   to	   American	   individualism”	   to	   be	   seriously	  
contemplated.	  Thus,	   although	   the	  potential	   options	   for	  understanding	   the	   corporation	  as	  
an	  entity	  were	  and	  are	  numerous,127	  American	  scholars	  narrowly	  conceived	  the	  corporate	  
entity,	   the	   general	   scope	   of	  which	   can	   be	   appreciated	   from	   a	   reading	   of	   the	   Berle–Dodd	  
debate	  of	  the	  1930s.128	  	  
The	   dawn	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century	   marked	   the	   rise	   of	   large	   corporations,	  
professional	  management,	  and	  passive	  investors.129	  This	  shift	  to	  professional	  management	  
created	  new	  opportunities	   for	   the	  exploitation	  of	   the	  shareholder	  class,130	  which	  was	  not	  
only	  growing	  in	  size,	  but	  was	  also	  increasingly	  less	  sophisticated.131	  This	  created	  a	  fear	  in	  
some	  that	  the	  social	  bonds,	  whether	  fiduciary	  or	  contractual	  in	  nature,	  between	  ownership	  
and	  control	  were	  too	  weak	  to	  adequately	  prevent	  managerial	  opportunism.	  The	  champion	  
of	  these	  concerns	  was	  Adolf	  A.	  Berle,	  who,	  starting	  in	  1923,	  developed	  legal	  arguments	  to	  
the	   effect	   that	   the	   contractual	   and	   fiduciary	   bonds	   owed	   by	   corporate	   managers	   to	  
shareholders	  needed	  to	  be	  taken	  more	  seriously.132	  Accordingly,	  his	  shareholder	  primacy	  
                                                
124 Most notably, Gunther Teubner built on Niklas Luhmann’s theories, constructing a theory of the corporation 
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system, see Dirk Baecker, The Form of the Firm, 13 ORGANIZATION 109 (2006). 
125 Id. 
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127 See, e.g., GIERKE, supra note 123; Baecker, supra note 124; Teubner, supra note 124. 
128 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 
2 U. CHI L. REV. 194 (1935); Berle, Jr., A Note, supra note 69; Dodd, supra note 71; Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers, 
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Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008). 
129 See ROY, supra note 101 (large corporations and the corporate revolution); Bratton, supra note 55, at 1487–
89 (management corporations); Michael Lounsbury & Ellen T. Crumley, New Practice Creation: An Institutional 
Perspective on Innovation, 28 ORG. STUD. 993, 997 (2007) (passive investments). 
130 ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (2d ed. 
1968).  
131 Id.  
132 For more on the development of Berle’s theory, see ADOLF A. BERLE, NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS 1918–1971: 
FROM THE PAPERS OF ADOLF A. BERLE 19 (Beatrice Bishop Berle & Travis Beal Jacobs eds., 1973) (entry from 
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argument	   declared	   that	   stock	   ownership	  was	   a	   type	   of	   private	   property,	  which	   imposed	  
fiduciary	   and	   contractual	   obligations	   upon	   corporate	  managers.133	   Yet,	   these	   obligations	  
were	  not	  between	  the	  managers	  and	  the	  owners;	  rather,	  the	  obligations	  were	  between	  the	  
managers	   and	   the	   property,	   which	   had	   “a	   corporal	   existence	   distinct	   from	   that	   of	   its	  
owners.”134	   These	   rights	   have	   sometimes	   been	   characterized	   as	   being	   owed	   to	   the	  
shareholders	   as	   a	   class,	   thus	   excluding	   the	   particular	   rights	   that	   individual	   shareholders	  
might	  have	  had.135	  	  
Underpinning	  Berle’s	   efforts	  was	   the	   ever-­‐widening	   diversity	   of	   share	   ownership,	  
which	   he	   thought	   continued	   to	   increase	   the	   potential	   for	   democratizing	   corporate	  
power.136	  For	  this	  reason,	  Berle	  theorized	  that	  if	  the	  law	  compelled	  corporate	  managers	  to	  
act	  for	  the	  sole	  benefit	  of	  shareholders,	  then	  the	  corporation	  would	  eventually	  be	  aligned	  
with	   the	  broader	  polity	   of	  American	   society.137	  This	  was	   the	   foundational	  motivation	   for	  
Berle’s	  shareholder	  primacy	  argument.138	  
As	   a	   side	   note,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   in	   1932	   Berle	   published	   The	   Modern	  
Corporation	  and	  Private	  Property	  with	  Gardiner	  C.	  Means.139	  This	  book,	  in	  part,	  has	  a	  much	  
different	   message	   than	   his	   shareholder	   primacy	   argument,	   proposing	   that	   the	   modern	  
corporation	   was	   challenging	   the	   traditional	   conception	   of	   property.140	   Berle	   understood	  
that	  shareholder	  primacy	  was	  not	  the	  only	  path	  to	  making	  corporate	  power	  respect	  public	  
interest	   concerns.141	  He	   also	   believed	   that	   another	   path	  was	   that	   of	   greater	   government	  
intervention	   in	   corporate	   affairs,	   which	   he	   endorsed	   in	   the	   last	   chapter	   of	   the	   book.142	  
However,	   he	   also	   appreciated	   that	   greater	   government	   intervention	  was	   only	   possible	   if	  
the	  political	  landscape	  shifted.	  And	  by	  the	  early	  1930s,	  Berle	  began	  to	  appreciate	  that	  such	  
a	  shift	  might	  occur	  if	  Roosevelt	  won	  the	  election	  in	  1933.143	  	  
The	   first	   article	   of	   the	   Berle–Dodd	   debate	   is	   a	   replication	   of	   a	   chapter	   from	   The	  
Modern	   Corporation	   and	   Private	   Property,	   with	   one	   key	   omission:	   	   Berle’s	   shareholder	  
primacy	   argument	   was	   constructed	   “with	   full	   realization	   of	   the	   possibility	   that	   private	  
property	  may	  one	  day	  cease	   to	  be	   the	  basic	   concept	   in	   terms	  of	  which	   the	  courts	  handle	  
problems	   of	   large	   scale	   enterprise.”144	   He	   also	   admitted	   in	   this	   omitted	   text	   that	   it	   was	  
possible	  that	  “the	  entire	  system	  [had]	  to	  be	  revalued”	  and	  that	  “the	  corporate	  profit	  stream	  
in	   reality	   no	   longer	   [was]	   private	   property,”	   asserting	   that	   a	   new	   theory	   of	   the	  modern	  
corporation	  would	  likely	  develop.145	  But	  he	  qualified	  these	  views	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  sociological	  
                                                                                                                                                       
Berle’s personal diary on Aug. 25, 1932); A. A. Berle, Jr., Non-Voting Stock and “Bankers’ Control,” 39 HARV. L. 
REV. 673 (1926) [hereinafter Berle, Jr., Non-Voting Stock]; A. A. Berle, Jr., Participating Preferred Stock, 26 
COLUM. L. REV. 303 (1926); A. A. Berle, Jr., Problems of Non-Par Stocks, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 43 (1925); A. A. 
Berle, Jr., Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 358 (1923). 
133 Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers, supra note 69. 
134 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 10, at 27. 
135 BERLE, supra note 132. 
136 Stewart, supra note 128, at 1460–63. 
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138 For more on the development of Berle’s theory, see sources cited supra note 132. 
139 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 130. 
140 Id. at 302–08. 
141 Stewart, supra note 128, at 1473. 
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study,	  which	  had	  not	  yet	  attained	  a	  standing	  as	  a	  “matter	  of	  law.”146	  	  
Accordingly,	   Berle	   recommended	   that	   until	   a	   new	   corporate	   theory	   became	   a	  
“matter	  of	   law,”	   lawyers	  and	   legal	   academics	  must	  do	   their	  best	  within	   the	  existing	   legal	  
framework—that	  being	  to	  think	  “in	  terms	  of	  private	  property.”147	  Berle	  did	  just	  that	  in	  his	  
1931	  article,	  arguing	  “all	  powers	  granted	  to	  a	  corporation	  .	  .	  .	  are	  .	  .	  .	  at	  all	  times	  exercisable	  
only	   for	   the	   ratable	   benefits	   of	   all	   the	   shareholders	   as	   their	   interest	   appears”148	  without	  
qualification.	  Knowing	  that	  the	  concession	  theory	  would	  not	  be	  accepted	  in	  the	  1920s,	  and	  
still	  wanting	  to	  tie	  corporate	  power	  to	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  boarder	  polity,	  he	  believed	  that	  
the	  only	  corporate	  theory	  that	  could	  adequately	  serve	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  regulate	  the	  firm—at	  that	  
time—was	  the	  corporation	  as	  private	  property.149	  Berle	  saw	  this	  as	  his	  only	  solution.150	  	  
Berle	  did	  not	  directly	  explain	  the	  entity	  as	  private	  property,	  but	  the	  theory	  is	  simple	  
enough.	   The	   law	   regulates	   the	   corporation	   as	   property.	   This	   property	   is	   owned	   by	  
shareholders.	   Shareholders	   have	   the	   authority	   to	   elect	   directors	   because	   of	   their	  
ownership	   interest	   in	   the	   corporation.	   When	   shareholders	   elect	   directors,	   they	   also	  
delegate	   the	   authority	   to	   run	   the	   corporation	   to	   the	   directors.	   Directors	   then	   in	   turn	  
delegate	  part	  of	  this	  authority	  to	  executive	  management	  to	  oversee	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  affairs	  of	  
the	   corporation.	  Thus,	  directors	   and	  management	  had	  an	  obligation	   to	   shareholders	  as	   a	  
class	  and	  not	  merely	  to	  the	  group	  of	  shareholders	  that	  consolidated	  control.151	  This	  created	  
fiduciary	   and	   contractual	   obligations	   to	   protect	   minority	   shareholder	   interests	   in	   all	  
circumstances.152	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   law	   imposed	   obligations	   upon	   directors	   and	  
management	   to	   treat	   all	   shareholders	   evenhandedly,	   guaranteeing	   that	   the	   interests	   of	  
ownership	  were	  not	  undermined.153	  
E.	   Merrick	   Dodd	   thought	   Berle’s	   shareholder	   primacy	   argument	   was	   dangerous,	  
because	   such	   shareholders	   only	   cared	   about	   profits	   and	   not	   about	   the	   broader	   issues	   of	  
corporate	  social	  responsibility.154	  Dodd	  endorsed	  a	  more	  radical	  entity	  theory	  of	  the	  firm	  
that	  hinted	  at	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  corporation	  was	  more	  than	  private	  property,	  and	  thus	  when	  
managers	   served	   the	  best	   interests	   of	   the	   corporation,	   they	  would	  be	   serving	  more	   than	  
merely	   the	   interests	   of	   property	   holders.155	   Dodd	   was,	   in	   fact,	   suggesting	   that	   the	  
corporation	  was	  separate	  from	  its	  aggregate	  parts,	  a	  social	  entity	  which	  tied	  managers	  to	  
serve	   the	   interests	   of	   a	   broader	   spectrum	   of	   corporate	   constituents.156	   He	   never	   clearly	  
articulated	  what	  the	  corporation	  was	  as	  an	  entity,	  and	  yet	  he	  pushed	  forward,	  advocating	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for	  managers	   to	   be	   freer	   than	  Berle	   thought	   they	   should	  be.157	  Dodd	   thought	   this	  would	  
protect	   better	   employees,	   creditors	   and	   the	   community-­‐at-­‐large;158	   this	   theory,	   which	  
promotes	   a	   broader	   discretion	   for	   managers	   over	   corporate	   function,	   has	   been	   called	  
managerialism.159	  
Although	  Berle	  was	  sympathetic	   to	  the	  ends	  of	  Dodd’s	  managerialism,	  he	  thought	  that	  
Dodd’s	   agenda	   was	   dangerously	   optimistic,	   because	   his	   theory	   was	   theoretically	  
impoverished.160	   Berle	   argued	   that	   this	   form	   of	  managerialism	  would	   free	   directors	   and	  
executive	  officers	   from	   the	   constraints	  of	   their	   fiduciary	  duties	   to	   shareholders,	  basically	  
granting	   them	   broad	   discretion	   over	   corporate	   power	   in	   the	   vain	   hope	   they	   would	   be	  
responsible.161	   This	   freedom	   to	   engage	   opportunism	   was	   precisely	   what	   Berle	   was	  
attempting	   to	   avoid,	   and	   he	   was	   thus	   skeptical	   and	   leery	   of	   Dodd’s	   corporate	   social	  
responsibility	  agenda.162	  	  
Berle’s	  and	  Dodd’s	  entity	  theories	  of	  the	  corporation	  survived	  in	  some	  form	  until	  the	  
start	   of	   the	   1970s.	   For	   instance,	   in	   1970	   Milton	   Friedman	   took	   up	   a	   version	   of	   Berle’s	  
private	  property	  entity	  theory	  of	  the	  corporation,163	  writing:	  	  
In	   a	   free	   enterprise,	   private	   property	   system,	   a	   corporate	   executive	   is	   an	  
employee	  of	  the	  owners	  of	  the	  business.	  He	  has	  [a]	  direct	  responsibility	  to	  his	  
employers.	   That	   responsibility	   is	   to	   conduct	   business	   in	   accordance	   with	  
their	   desires,	   which	   generally	  will	   be	   to	  make	   as	  much	  money	   as	   possible	  
while	  conforming	  to	  the	  basic	  rules	  of	  society.164	  	  	  
It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  Friedman	  constructed	  the	  interests	  of	  shareholders	  as	  those	  of	  
profiteers	  with	  minimal	  regard	  for	  corporate	  social	  responsibility,	  while	  Berle	  constructed	  
the	  interests	  of	  shareholders	  as	  those	  of	  the	  broader	  polity	  with	  great	  regard	  for	  corporate	  
social	  responsibility.	  Thus,	  with	  the	  shift	  in	  normative	  claims	  attaching	  to	  the	  entity	  theory,	  
a	  shift	  in	  the	  policy	  prescriptions	  that	  logically	  flow	  from	  it	  can	  be	  observed.	  	  
	   A	  counter	  example	  to	  Friedman’s	  entity	  theory	  was	  that	  of	  his	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century	  
contemporary	  John	  Galbraith.	  Galbraith	  argued	  that	  management	  of	  the	  economy	  was	  to	  be	  
carried	   out	   as	   a	   public–private	   partnership	   between	   large	   corporate	   entities	   and	  
government;	   implicit	   in	   this	   argument	   is	   a	   Dodd-­‐ish	   managerialism	   that	   suggested	   that	  
managers	  were	  not	  accountable	  to	  shareholders	  but	  to	  the	  corporation,	  which	  in	  turn	  was	  
accountable	  to	  broader	  public	  interest	  concerns.165	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note,	  for	  general	  
context,	   that	   this	   sort	  of	  heroic	  managerialism	  exploded	   in	  popularity	  at	   the	   time.	   It	  was	  
deeply	  enamored	  with	  the	  vision	  of	  corporate	  managers	  as	  stewards	  of	  society.	  Like	  with	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Dodd’s	  theory,	   there	  was	   little	  concern	  for	  theoretical	  assumptions	  that	  underpinned	  this	  
enthusiasm,	   regarding	   the	   corporation	   as	   a	   “social	   institution”	   without	   further	  
contemplation	  for	  what	  sort	  of	  entity	  this	  might	  be.166	  
Upon	   reflection,	   what	   is	   clear	   about	   the	   use	   of	   the	   entity	   theory	   during	   the	  mid-­‐
twentieth	   century	   was	   that	   it	   could	   be,	   and	   was,	   employed	   by	   both	   advocates	   for	   free	  
markets,	  like	  Friedman,167	  and	  by	  advocates	  for	  government	  control,	  like	  Galbraith.168	  This	  
observation	  conforms	  to	  Dewey’s169	  and	  Millon’s170	  arguments,	  which	  contended	  that	  these	  
essentialist	   theories	   are	   indeterminate,	   and	   also	   Horwitz’s171	   historical	   narrative	   that	  
argued	  that	  this	  indeterminacy	  has	  been	  narrowed	  at	  different	  points	  in	  history,	  because	  of	  
its	   political	   usage	   by	   prevailing	   interests.	   Thus,	   although	   the	   entity	   theory	   was	   used	   to	  
advocate	   the	  private	  nature	  of	   the	  corporation,	   it	  was	  also	  used	   to	  argue	   for	  government	  
intervention.	  When	  the	  indeterminacy	  of	  an	  essentialist	  theory	  is	  exposed	  in	  this	  manner,	  it	  
becomes	  more	  translucent	  and	  the	  interests	  behind	  the	  theory	  become	  more	  visible.	  
As	  with	  his	   rejection	  of	   the	   concession	   theory,	  when	  Bainbridge	   rejects	   the	   entity	  
theory,	   he	   provides	   another	   excellent	   example	   of	   how	   some	   aggregate	   contractarian	  
theorists	   fail	   to	   appreciate	   that	   all	   essentialist	   theories,	   including	   the	   aggregate	  
contractarian	  theory,	  are	  indeterminate.	  Bainbridge	  writes:	  
[An	   entity	   theory]	   requires	   one	   to	   reify	   the	   corporation;	   i.e.,	   to	   treat	   the	  
corporation	   as	   something	   separate	   from	   its	   various	   constituents.	   While	  
reification	  provides	  a	  necessary	  semantic	  shorthand,	  it	  creates	  a	  sort	  of	  false	  
consciousness	  when	   taken	   to	  extremes.	  The	  corporation	   is	  not	  a	   thing.	  The	  
corporation	  is	  a	  legal	  fiction	  representing	  the	  unique	  vehicle	  by	  which	  large	  
groups	  of	  individuals,	  each	  offering	  a	  different	  factor	  of	  production,	  privately	  
order	   their	   relationships	   so	   as	   to	   collectively	  produce	  marketable	   goods	  or	  
services.172	  	  
Bainbridge	  steps	  into	  the	  world	  of	  the	  sociology	  of	  knowledge	  when	  he	  chooses	  to	  discuss	  
how	  theory	  reifies	  reality,	  and	  he	  is	  only	  partly	  correct	  in	  his	  assessment.	  The	  entity	  theory	  
reifies	   the	   corporation,	   but	   all	   essentialist	   theories	   “reify	   the	   corporation.”173	   The	   entity	  
theory	  provides	  a	   form	  of	   “semantic	  shorthand,”	  but	  all	  essentialist	   theories	  are	   forms	  of	  
“semantic	   shorthand.”174	   The	   entity	   theory	   creates	   “false	   consciousness,”	   but	   all	   theories	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create	   “false	   consciousness.”175	   Bainbridge	   slips	   when	   suggesting	   that	   aggregate	  
contractarian	   theory	   is	   superior	   to	   the	   other	   theories.	   Simply	   put,	   his	   tacit	   claim	   that	  
aggregate	  contractarian	  theory	  is	  non-­‐reifying	  is	  unsupportable.	  	  
Dewey	  appreciated	   this	  point:	   the	   factualness	  of	   a	   claim	  was	  neither	   absolute	  nor	  
arbitrary.176	  He	  suggested	  that	  the	  “eventful	  character	  of	  all	  existences”	  was	  no	  reason	  to	  
attempt	   to	   find	   balance	   by	   clinging	   to	   either	   extreme.177	   Instead,	   he	   advised	   that	   the	  
inquirer	  should	  examine	  the	  relevant	  variables	  involved	  in	  a	  problem,178	  so	  that	  no	  claim	  is	  
uncritically	   reified	   as	   fact.179	  Dewey	   suggested	   that	  without	   a	   reflective	   re-­‐assessment	  of	  
claims	   within	   specific	   social	   contexts,	   these	   claims	   stop	   serving	   as	   tools	   for	   the	   honest	  
observation	  of	  social	  function,	  and	  can	  start	  “prevent[ing]	  the	  communication	  of	  ideas,”180	  
and	   thus	   learning.	   Consequently,	   if	  Dewey	   is	   correct,	   embracing	   the	   indeterminacy	   of	   all	  
essentialist	   theories	   ought	   to	   better	   equip	   legal	   thinkers	   to	   learn	   how	   corporations	  
function.	  	  
	  
IV.	  THE	  RISE	  OF	  THE	  AGGREGATE	  CONTRACTARIAN	  THEORY	  	  
The	  entity	   theory	  of	   the	   corporation	  as	  private	  property	  began	   to	   lose	   its	  hold	  on	  
American	  corporate	  legal	  thinking	  in	  the	  1960s.181	  In	  1962,	  Henry	  Manne	  attacked	  Berle’s	  
model	  of	  ownership	  and	  control,	  arguing	  that	  there	  were	  links	  between	  the	  price	  of	  stocks	  
on	  secondary	  markets,	  the	  residual	  value	  of	  the	  corporation,	  and	  managerial	  behavior	  that	  
anachronistic	   thinkers	   like	  Berle	  never	   appreciated.182	   For	   instance,	  Manne	  detailed	  how	  
poor	  corporate	  management	  can	  depress	  share	  price	  to	  a	   level	   in	  which	  share	  price	  does	  
not	  reflect	   the	  corporation’s	  potential	  profitability;	   the	  corporation	  at	   this	  point	  may	   lure	  
an	   investor	   to	   take	   over	   the	   corporation	   and	   replace	   its	   management	   team	   in	   order	   to	  
improve	   corporate	   performance	   (profitability).183	   Such	   threats	   to	   corporate	   boards	   thus	  
become	  a	  control	  mechanism	  for	  managerial	  performance.184	  What	  is	  most	  germane	  to	  the	  
rise	   of	   the	   aggregate	   contractarian	   perspective	   is	   that,	   to	   make	   such	   arguments,	   Manne	  
employed	  classical	  economic	  thinking,	  which	  understands	  the	  corporation	  by	  observing	  it	  
through	  the	  lens	  of	  the	  aggregate	  theory.185	  	  
Manne	  borrowed	   from	   the	   contribution	  made	  by	   classical	   economists,	   like	  Ronald	  
Coase,186	  who	  set	  out	  to	  challenge	  the	  entity	  theory	  of	  the	  corporation.187	  Coase	  suggested	  
that	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  corporation,	  observers	  ought	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  transaction	  costs	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that	   a	   corporation	   confronted	   when	   operating	   within	   the	   market.188	   By	   directing	   legal	  
thinkers	   to	   understand	   the	   corporation	   in	   terms	   of	   how	   its	   aggregates	   make	   decisions	  
about	  how	  to	  allocate	  resources	  based	  on	  price	  indicators,	  Manne	  planted	  the	  seeds	  of	  the	  
modern	   aggregate	   theory	   within	   corporate	   legal	   thinking.189	   At	   the	   core	   of	   Manne’s	  
thinking	   were	   ideas	   like	   Friedrich	   Hayek’s.	   Hayek	   suggested	   that	   private	   ordering	  
depended	  upon	  the	  price	  mechanism,	  which	  facilitated	  the	  necessary	  information	  transfers	  
between	   actors	   for	   decentralized	   market-­‐based	   transactions	   to	   occur.190	   Such	  
decentralized	   transactions	   were	   desirable,	   Hayek	   argued,	   because	   they	   were	   efficient	   at	  
allocating	  scarce	  resources	  to	  meet	  demands	  within	  an	  economic	  system.191	  	  
Coase’s	   work	   went	   further	   than	   Manne’s.	   He	   observed	   the	   operation	   of	   large	  
corporations	   and	   concluded	   that	   these	   economic	   units	   function	   in	   a	   manner	   that	  
circumvented	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   price	   mechanism.192	   The	   corporation	   took	   what	   was	  
occurring	   in	   the	  market	   and	   internalized	   that	   function	  of	   the	  market	  within	   itself.193	   For	  
instance,	  instead	  of	  a	  shoe	  producer	  contracting	  individually	  in	  the	  market	  with	  the	  makers	  
of	  shoe	  soles,	  leather	  uppers,	  laces,	  insoles,	  and	  so	  forth,	  a	  corporation	  may	  hire	  all	  of	  the	  
people	   necessary	   to	   make	   the	   shoes	   and	   thus	   it	   centralizes	   all	   of	   the	   components	   of	  
production	   in-­‐house.	   The	   result	   is	   that	   the	   corporation	  makes	   shoes	   less	   expensively	   by	  
controlling	  production.	  	  
From	   Coase’s	   perspective,	   the	   corporation	   was	   like	   a	   more	   highly	   coordinated	  
micro-­‐market	   that	  operated	  within	   the	   larger	  market	  and	   imposed	  cost	  efficiencies	  upon	  
the	  components	  of	  production.194	  Put	  differently,	  the	  corporation	  was	  a	  centrally	  controlled	  
production	  system	  within	   the	   larger	  economy	  that	  avoided	   transaction	  costs	  by	  reducing	  
the	  price	  of	  production	  to	  less	  than	  what	  occurred	  in	  the	  market	  without	  such	  coordinated	  
efforts.	   Thus,	   the	   function	   of	   the	   corporation	   could	   be	   understood	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  
transaction	  costs	  within	  the	  firm	  versus	  those	  outside	  the	  firm.	  
From	   this	   understanding	   of	   the	   corporation,	   Coase	   argued	   that	   it	  was	   possible	   to	  
understand	  what	  controlled	  the	  size	  of	  corporations.195	  He	  suggested	  that	  corporations	  are	  
created	   to	   lower	   costs	   below	   the	   cost	   of	   production	   in	   the	   market.196	   The	   corporation	  
would	   only	   internalize	   transactions	   (components	   of	   production)	   until	   the	   cost	   of	  
production	  was	   equal	   to	   or	   higher	   than	   the	   cost	   of	   transactions	   in	   the	  market.197	  At	   this	  
point,	   the	   centralized	   system	   was	   no	   longer	   more	   efficient	   than	   the	   function	   of	   the	  
market.198	  Thus,	  firm	  size	  was	  dependent	  on	  the	  transaction	  costs	  inside	  and	  outside	  of	  the	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corporation.199	  A	  good	  example	  of	  how	  this	  theory	  actually	  translated	  into	  practice	  is	  when	  
a	   number	   of	   corporations	   reduced	   their	   size	   in	   the	   1990s	   as	   a	   result	   of	   innovations	   in	  
communication,	   logistics	  and	  transportation,	  which	  made	  outsourcing	  more	  cost-­‐effective	  
than	  maintaining	  many	  components	  of	  production	  in-­‐house.200	  In	  other	  words,	  innovations	  
in	  communication,	   logistics	  and	  transportation	  made	  production	   in	  market	  more	  efficient	  
than	  production	  in	  the	  corporation.	  
In	   1970,	  Manne’s	   theory	   for	   a	  market	   for	  managerial	   control	  was	   reinforced	   by	   a	  
brilliant	  young	  economist	  named	  Eugene	  Fama,	  who	  had	  just	  completed	  his	  doctoral	  work	  
on	  the	  efficiency	  of	  markets.201	  Building	  upon	  how	  price	  mechanisms	  reflect	  the	  available	  
knowledge	  about	  products	  and	  the	  role	  that	  competitive	  markets	  played	  in	  gathering	  that	  
knowledge,	   Fama	   suggested	   that	   the	   price	   of	   corporate	   securities	   was	   based	   on	   the	  
available	  information	  about	  corporate	  stocks	  known	  by	  investors.202	  His	  research	  became	  
synonymous	  with	   the	  “efficient	  capital	  markets	  hypothesis,”	  which	  assumes	   that	   financial	  
markets	  efficiently	  respond	  to	  available	  information.203	  	  
In	   a	   practical	   sense,	   Fama’s	   economic	   model	   provides	   an	   empirical	   basis	   for	  
studying	  how	  sophisticated	  financial	  analysts	  and	  investors,	  who	  closely	  examine	  the	  data	  
about	  publicly	  traded	  companies,	  ensure	  that	  stock	  markets	  are	  always	  highly	  efficient	  at	  
pricing	   firm	  value.204	  As	  new	   information	  about	  a	  company	  becomes	  publicly	  known,	   the	  
theory	  asserts	  that	  stock	  price	  will	  adjust	  accordingly.205	  Thus,	  the	  price	  of	  a	  stock	  reflects	  
the	   best	   available	   opinion	   as	   to	   whether	   or	   not	   a	   company	   will	   be	   profitable	   moving	  
forward.206	  	  
Fama’s	   theory	  helped	  to	  make	  sense	  of	   the	  complex	   interrelationship	  of	  managers	  
(directors	   and	   executives)	   and	   risk	   bearers	   (investors)	   as	   aggregate	   participants	   within	  
corporate	   governance.	   Fama’s	  work	   reinforced	   the	  work	   of	   Henry	  Manne,	  which	   argued	  
that	   investors	   far	   removed	   from	   the	   nuances	   of	   a	   corporate	   governance	   structure	   could	  
meaningfully	   participate	   in	   corporate	   governance	   by	   responding	   to	   price	   signals	   that	  
reduced	  the	  complexity	  of	   information	   into	  a	  readily	  understandable	  signal:	   	   the	  rise	  and	  
fall	  of	  stock	  value.207	  Thus,	  the	  evolution	  of	  “efficient	  capital	  markets	  hypothesis”	  helped	  to	  
kindle	  faith	  in	  the	  ability	  of	  market	  competition	  to	  produce	  optimal	  corporate	  governance	  
outcomes,	   leading	   to	   the	   general	   opinion	   that	   government	   intervention	   in	   corporate	  
governance	   and	   markets	   was	   not	   only	   unnecessary,	   but	   could	   in	   fact	   hamper	   the	  
performance	   of	   corporations,	   and	   even	   possibly	   as	   Milton	   Friedman	   suggested	   lead	   to	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totalitarianism!208	   If	  markets	   occurred	   naturally,	   and	   if	   regulation	   impeded	   their	   natural	  
operation,	   then	   it	   was	   assumed	   that	   efficient	   function	   of	   financial	   markets	   prevented	  
suboptimal	  corporate	  governance	  arrangements,	  simply	  by	  exit	  (selling	  their	  stocks).209	  In	  
other	  words,	   if	   financial	  markets	  were	   largely	   free	   from	   regulation,	   and	   if	   securities	   law	  
required	  corporate	  managers	  to	  provide	  relevant	  information	  about	  corporate	  governance,	  
sophisticated	  financial	  analysts	  and	  investors	  could	  adjust	  stock	  value	  based	  on	  the	  present	  
potential	  for	  profitability	  of	  any	  particular	  corporation.	  	  
Fama’s	   theory	   and	  method	   for	   establishing	   the	   correlations	   that	   existed	   between	  
poor	   corporate	   governance	   performance	   and	   stock	   price	   gave	   Manne’s	   “market	   for	  
corporate	  control”	  empirical	  prowess.210	  Discounting	  the	  stock	  value	  not	  only	  impacted	  the	  
capability	   of	   a	   corporation	   to	   raise	   capital,	   but	   it	   also	   increased	   the	   risk	   of	   corporate	  
takeover,	  which	  directly	  threatened	  the	  jobs	  of	  corporate	  managers.211	  The	  theory	  made	  a	  
convincing	  argument	  that	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  accurately	  discount	  stock	  value	  as	  a	  response	  
to	  poor	   corporate	  governance	  performance.212	   It	   also	  provided	  a	   flexible,	   responsive	  and	  
consensual	   mechanism	   for	   enforcement,	   which	   ensured	   that	   corporate	   managers	   were	  
performing	  effectively.	  More	  specifically,	  it	  provided	  a	  picture	  of	  corporate	  governance	  as	  a	  
complex	  web	  of	  aggregate	  risk	  bearers	  and	  managers	  all	  joined	  by	  the	  price	  mechanism.	  
A	  couple	  of	  years	  after	  Fama	  published	  his	  seminal	  1970	  article,213	  Armen	  Alchian	  
and	  Harold	  Demsetz	  made	  another	   landmark	  contribution	   to	   the	  aggregate	   theory	  of	   the	  
corporation	  by	  introducing	  the	  nexus-­‐of-­‐contracts	  theory	  as	  an	  expansion	  and	  revision	  of	  
Coase’s	   theories.214	   They	   argued	   that	   Coase	   exaggerated	   the	   importance	   of	   transaction	  
costs	  when	  attempting	  to	  understand	  why	  corporations	  exist.215	  For	  Alchian	  and	  Demsetz,	  
it	   was	   not	   the	   reduction	   of	   transaction	   costs	   that	   made	   the	   firm	   more	   efficient	   than	  
markets;	  rather	  the	  firm	  was	  more	  efficient	  because	  it	  could	  channel	  information	  between	  
aggregate	  constituents	  of	  the	  corporation	  better	  than	  the	  market	  could	  (resulting	  in	  lower	  
information	  costs).216	  	  
Another	  perspective	  that	  added	  to	  the	  advancement	  of	  the	  aggregate	  theory	  was	  the	  
1976	   article	   by	   Michael	   Jensen	   and	   William	   Meckling.217	   This	   article	   changed	   the	   way	  
American	   legal	   scholarship	   thought	   about	   agency	   theory	   by	   more	   firmly	   harnessing	   an	  
expanded	  theory	  of	  transaction	  costs	  to	  agency	  theory.218	  The	  authors	  argued	  that	  one	  way	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that	   managers	   could	   be	   held	   accountable	   would	   be	   to	   require	   financial	   disclosure	   and	  
inspection	   of	   the	   firm’s	   accounts	   by	   independent	   auditors.219	   The	   work	   of	   such	  
independent	  auditors	  necessarily	  created	  “monitoring	  costs,”	  which	  were	  necessary	  evils	  if	  
competition	  was	  to	  police	  managerial	  discretion.220	  This	  suggestion	  was	  much	  in	  line	  with	  
Fama’s	  work	   on	   efficient	   capital	  markets221	   and	  Manne’s	  work	   on	  market	   for	   control.222	  
However,	  the	  authors	  admitted	  that	  monitoring	  strategies223	  could	  not	  eliminate	  the	  risk	  of	  
opportunism	   and	   other	   inefficiencies	   created	   by	   the	   agency	   relationship.224	   They	   called	  
these	  inevitable	  costs	  “residual	  loss,”225	  referring	  to	  the	  shareholder’s	  residual	  claim	  on	  the	  
corporation.	  With	  the	  growing	  acceptance	  of	  this	  understanding	  of	  the	  agency	  relationship,	  
the	  issues	  of	  agency	  theory	  were	  decisively	  shifted	  from	  the	  entity	  to	  aggregate	  theory.226	  
Jensen	  and	  Meckling’s	   theory	  also	  was	  much	   in	   line	  with	  Alchian	  and	  Demsetz’s.227	  They	  
also	  argued	  that	  all	  of	  the	  firm’s	  activities	  could	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  contracts	  (the	  
formalized	   normative	   legal	   information)	   that	   shape	   the	   relationships	   between	  
constituents.228	  They	  suggested	  that	  the	  corporation	  was	  no	  more	  than	  a	  “nexus	  for	  a	  set	  of	  
contracting	  relationships	  among	  individuals.”229	  	  
In	   the	   1980s,	   Easterbrook	   and	   Fischel	   crystalized	   the	   aggregate	   contractarian	  
theory	   within	   American	   corporate	   law	   by	   publishing	   the	   lion’s	   share	   of	   this	   legal	   and	  
economic	   theorizing.230	   Their	   translation	   of	   the	   arguments	   of	   Coase,231	   Hayek,232	  
Friedman,233	  Fama,234	   and	  other	  economists235	  persuaded	  corporate	   legal	   thinkers	   that	   if	  
corporate	  law	  better	  facilitated	  freedom	  of	  contract,	  then	  the	  potential	  of	  markets	  could	  be	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unleashed.236	  Furthermore,	  there	  was	  no	  need	  to	  be	  concerned	  about	  the	  loss	  of	  regulatory	  
control,	   because	   competitive	   markets	   insured	   a	   consensual	   enforcement	   mechanism	   for	  
managerial	  decision-­‐making	  based	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  self-­‐interested	  actors	  to	  hold	  each	  other	  
in	   check.237	   Thus,	   if	   markets	   were	   left	   to	   their	   own	   devices,	   then	   they	   would	   find	   an	  
equilibrium	   that	   established	   an	   optimal	   balance	   between	   all	   corporate	   constituents.238	  
With	  Easterbrook	  and	  Fischel’s	  publications,	  these	  already	  popular	  economic	  notions	  about	  
corporate	   governance,	   markets	   and	   regulation	   soon	   prevailed	   over	   other	   essentialist	  
theories	  within	  corporate	  legal	  thought.239	  
By	   the	   1990s,	   Easterbrook	   and	   Fischel	   marveled	   at	   the	   efficiency	   of	   modern	  
corporate	  law.240	  They	  detailed	  the	  consequences	  of	  providing	  off-­‐the-­‐rack	  default	  rules	  for	  
incorporation.241	   On	   one	   hand,	   these	   optional	   rules	   assisted	   less	   sophisticated	  
incorporators	   to	   select	   a	   low-­‐cost	   framework	   that,	   for	  most	   firms,	  would	   “maximize	   the	  
value	   of	   corporate	   endeavor[s]	   as	   a	   whole”.242	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   their	   optional	   nature	  
averted	  corporate	   law	  from	  imposing	  a	  rigid	  regulatory	  framework,	  which	  most	  certainly	  
would	   restrict	   shrewd	   business	   people	   from	   customizing	   corporate	   entities	   to	   exploit	  
uncommon	   business	   opportunities.243	   They	   described	   modern	   corporate	   law	   as	   an	  
“economizing	  device”	  which	  reduced	  the	  cost	  of	  consensual	  bargaining	  without	  sacrificing	  
dynamism.244	  	  	  
Easterbrook	  and	  Fischel	  compared	  corporate	  law	  to	  the	  regulation	  of	  other	  areas	  of	  
society,	   determining	   that	   it	   was	   unique.245	   They	   compared	   it	   to	   administrative	   law,	  
observing	   that	   the	   discretion	   of	   administrative	   officials	   was	   tightly	   constrained	   by	  
regulation	   and	   closely	   scrutinized	  by	   judicial	   oversight.246	  By	   comparison,	   they	   observed	  
that	   corporate	   law	   “allow[ed]	   managers	   and	   investors	   to	   write	   their	   own	   tickets,	   to	  
establish	   systems	   of	   governance	   without	   substantive	   scrutiny	   from	   a	   regulator,”247	   and	  
furthermore,	   that	   the	   “business	   judgment	   rule”	   instructed	   courts	   to	   adopt	   a	   “hands-­‐off	  
approach.”248	   While	   the	   administrative	   officials	   were	   tightly	   regulated	   and	   closely	  
scrutinized,	  corporate	  managers	  were	  free	  to	  do	  basically	  whatever	  they	  like.249	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Easterbrook	  and	  Fischel	  explained	  that,	  upon	  close	  inspection,	  corporate	  managers	  
were	  not	   as	   free	  as	   they	  might	   appear	   at	   first	   glance.250	  Although	   corporate	   law	  stepped	  
back	   from	   imposing	   command-­‐and-­‐control	   regulation	   upon	   corporate	   governance,	   they	  
asserted	   that	   there	   were	   still	   enforcement	   mechanisms	   that	   regulated	   the	   action	   of	  
corporate	  managers.251	  They	  detailed	  how	  other	  constituents	  of	  the	  firm	  (such	  as	  investors,	  
employers,	  consumers,	  creditors	  etc.)	  contracted/negotiated	  with	  corporate	  managers	  in	  a	  
manner	   that	   would	   make	   some	   decisions	   profitable	   and	   others	   not.252	   For	   instance,	  
corporate	  managers	   did	   not	   engage	   in	   opportunistic	   behavior,	   not	   because	   the	   law	  was	  
capable	  of	  preventing	  such	  behavior,	  but	  because	  it	  would	  decrease	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  
corporation,	   which	   would	   in	   turn	   decrease	   the	   value	   of	   its	   shares,	   resulting	   in	   ex	   ante	  
contractual	  penalties	   for	   the	  managers.253	  Examples	  of	  such	  ex	  ante	  contractual	  penalties	  
include	  the	  decreased	  potential	  value	  of	  a	  manager’s	  stock	  options,	   the	   threat	  of	  removal	  
due	  to	  poor	  performance	  and/or	  the	  threat	  of	  damage	  to	  reputation.254	  Thus,	  a	  cocktail	  of	  
free	  contracting,	  highly	  liquid	  markets,	  free	  flow	  of	  information,	  and	  self-­‐interest	  created	  a	  
balancing	  of	  interests	  between	  market	  actors	  within	  corporate	  governance	  that	  tended	  to	  
optimize	   corporate	   performance	   in	   each	   particular	   situation,	   depending	   upon	   the	  
competence	   of	   the	   negotiating	   parties	   in	   question.255	   And,	   in	   a	   world	   of	   consensual	  
contracting,	  without	  notable	  power	   imbalances	  and	   information	  asymmetries,	  equity	  was	  
satisfied	  in	  all	  but	  a	  few	  cases,	  because	  those	  who	  freely	  obliged	  themselves	  to	  bad	  bargains	  
could	   be	   expected	   to	   suffer	   the	   burden	   of	   the	   bargains,	   hopefully	   learning	   from	   the	  
experience,	  and	  thus,	  better	  equipping	  themselves	  for	  future	  contracting.256	  
The	  classic	  concern	  of	  corporate	  governance	  was	  the	  separation	  of	  ownership	  and	  
control.257	   From	   this	   perspective,	   the	   most	   obvious	   challenge	   to	   letting	   markets	   police	  
managerial	  behavior	  was	  that	  investors	  did	  not	  have	  the	  time,	  skill,	  or	  knowledge	  in	  order	  
to	   be	   able	   to	   properly	   negotiate	   and	   enforce	   the	   terms	   of	   corporate	   governance.258	   The	  
authors	   were	   quick	   to	   suggest	   how	   this	   was	   a	   misconception.259	   They	   explained	   that	  
American	  stock	  markets	  had	  teams	  of	  professional	  investors	  working	  alongside	  investment	  
advisors	  in	  order	  to	  oversee	  corporate	  performance.260	  Even	  though	  an	  individual	  investor	  
might	   not	   have	   the	   capacity	   to	   contract	   effectively	   they	   would	   be	   able	   to	   respond	   to	  
increases	   or	   decreases	   in	   stock	   value	   triggered	   by	   more	   sophisticated	   and	   powerful	  
investors	  in	  the	  market.261	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The	   large	  sophisticated	   investors,	  having	  enough	   financial	  might	   in	  stock	  markets,	  
could	  push	  the	  price	  enough	  to	  signal	  other	  investors	  that	  a	  stock	  value	  is	  too	  high	  or	  too	  
low.262	   These	   professional	   investors	   constantly	   engage	   in	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   corporate	  
management,	   governance	   structure,	   debt/equity	   ratios,	   and	   relative	   prowess	   when	  
compared	  to	  competitors.263	  Thus,	  tacitly	  relying	  on	  the	  commonly	  accepted	  arguments	  of	  
Friedrich	  Hayek,264	  Henry	  Manne265	   and	  Eugene	   Fama,266	   the	   authors	   suggested	   that	   the	  
operation	  of	  an	  effective	  price	  mechanism	  provided	  enough	  information	  for	  decentralized	  
actors	  to	  make	  efficient	  decisions.267	  The	  corporate	  legal	  world	  quickly	  warmed	  to	  the	  idea	  
that	   a	   corporate	   law	   that	   allows	   actors	   to	   “consensually”	   contract	   to	   protect	   their	   own	  
interests	   resulted	   in	  more	  optimal	   corporate	  governance	  structures.268	  By	  doing	   less	  and	  
allowing	  markets	  to	  function	  efficiently,	  corporate	  law	  encourages	  “what	  is	  optimal	  for	  the	  
firm	  and	  investors.”269	  	  
In	   the	   1980s	   and	  1990s,	   a	   number	   of	   powerful	   critiques	   reacted	   to	   the	   aggregate	  
contractarian	   theory.270	   In	   1985,	   Mark	   Granovetter	   noted	   that	   modeling	   based	   on	   this	  
theory	  tended	  to	  either	  undersocialize271	  or	  oversocialize272	  the	  corporation,	  leading	  to	  the	  
same	   result	   of	   formalizing	   the	   actual	   social	   relationships	   to	   a	   degree	   that	   did	   not	   reflect	  
what	   was	   actually	   happening	   within	   corporations.273	   In	   1989,	   Bratton	   carefully	  
contemplated	   a	   number	   of	   questionable	   assumptions	   about	   discrete	   contracts	   and	  
contractual	   gaps,	   which	   needed	   to	   be	   accepted,	   if	   the	   theory	   was	   to	   work.274	   In	   1995,	  
Lawrence	  Mitchell	   argued	   that	   the	   theory	   favored	   shareholders	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   other	  
corporate	   constituents,	  who	  either	  had	  no	  contract	   (like	   the	  community	  at	   large),	  or	  had	  
little	  power	  to	  negotiate	  the	  terms	  of	  their	  contract	  (like	  un-­‐unionized	  workers).275	  Each	  of	  
these	   critiques,	   and	   others	   like	   them,	   suggested	   that,	   in	   the	   end,	   this	   seemingly	   neutral	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theory	  might	  not	  be	  as	  objective	  as	  some	  assumed.276	  But,	   in	  the	  end,	   these	  critiques	  had	  
little	  impact	  on	  the	  use	  of	  this	  theory	  in	  corporate	  legal	  academia.	  	  
During	   the	   last	   decade,	   there	   has	   been	   one	  model	   aggregate	   contractarian	   theory	  
that	  stands	  out:	   	  Bainbridge’s	  director	  primacy	  model.277	  Bainbridge	  adopts	  a	  hierarchical	  
management	   structure	   that	   earlier	   contractarians	   tempted	   to	   flatten.278	   These	   earlier	  
contractarians	  used	  contract	  to	  explain	  away	  corporate	  hierarchy,279	  but	  Bainbridge	  rejects	  
such	   temptations,	   embracing	   the	   need	   for	   contract	   theory	   to	   account	   for	   “asymmetric	  
information”	  and	  “bilateral	  monopoly.”280	  Bainbridge	   is	  not	  as	  willing	  as	  Easterbrook	  and	  
Fischel	  were	  in	  1991	  to	  optimistically	  believe	  in	  the	  power	  of	  the	  market	  to	  arbitrate	  equity	  
within	  corporate	  governance.281	  For	  this	  reason,	  Bainbridge’s	  efforts	  ought	  to	  be	  celebrated	  
as	   an	   admirable	   advancement	   in	   this	   version	   of	   the	   aggregate	   contracarian	   theory.	  
Bainbridge	  describes	  his	  model	  as	  follows:	  
Instead	   of	   viewing	   the	   corporation	   either	   as	   a	   person	   or	   an	   entity,	  
contractarian	   scholars	   view	   it	   as	   an	   aggregate	   of	   various	   inputs	   acting	  
together	   to	   produce	   goods	   or	   services.	   Employees	   provide	   labor.	   Creditors	  
provide	  debt	  capital.	  Shareholders	  initially	  provide	  capital	  and	  subsequently	  
bear	   the	   risk	   of	   losses	   and	   monitor	   the	   performance	   of	   management.	  
Management	   monitors	   the	   performance	   of	   employees	   and	   coordinates	   the	  
activities	   of	   all	   the	   firm’s	   inputs.	   Accordingly,	   the	   firm	   is	   not	   a	   thing,	   but	  
rather	   a	   nexus	   of	   explicit	   and	   implicit	   contracts	   establishing	   rights	   and	  
obligations	  among	  various	  inputs	  making	  up	  the	  firm.282	  	  
This	   model	   does	   have	   its	   contractarian	   challengers.	   Contractarian	   purists,	   like	   Lucian	  
Bebchuk,	  are	  not	  so	  willing	  to	  give	  up	  the	  market	  for	  corporate	  control.283	  Bebchuk	  rejects	  
Bainbridge’s	  notion	  that	  allowing	  for	  managerial	  discretion	  maximizes	  shareholder	  wealth	  
and	  most	  effectively	  protects	  the	  interests	  of	  shareholders	  as	  a	  class.284	  	  
	   The	  now	  classic	  Bebchuk–Bainbridge	  debate285	  may	  prove	  to	  be	  the	  high	  watermark	  
for	  the	  present	  embodiment	  of	  the	  aggregate	  contractarian	  theory.	  The	  debate	  exemplifies	  
how,	  in	  the	  highest	  echelons	  of	  American	  corporate	  legal	  discourse,	  such	  debates	  could	  fit	  
comfortably	  within	  the	  still	  largely	  uncontested	  aggregate	  contractarian	  theory.	  This	  article	  
uses	  the	  words	  “largely	  uncontested,”	  because	  in	  2005–2006,	  when	  their	  debate	  occurred,	  
cracks	   had	   emerged	   in	   this	   paradigm.	   The	   succession	   of	   shockwaves,	   which	   started	   in	  
March	   2000	  when	   the	   Dot-­‐Com	   Bubble	   started	   to	   burst,	   damaged	   the	   credibility	   of	   this	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previously	   unquestionable	   theory.286	   The	   Enron	   fiasco	   did	   not	   help	   things	   either.287	  
However,	  after	  2008,	  confidence	  in	  the	  efficient	  market	  hypothesis	  was	  clearly	  shaken;288	  
even	  some	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  advocates	  of	  the	  market	  efficiency	  theory,	  such	  as	  Alan	  
Greenspan,	  publicly	  began	  to	  express	  doubt	  about	  it	  as	  presently	  conceived.289	  
In	   light	   of	   this,	   Thomas	   Joo	   envisions	   that	   corporate	   legal	   scholarship	   is	   about	   to	  
enter	   into	   a	   new	   post-­‐contractarian	   era,	   290	   seeing	   promise	   in	   the	   work	   being	   done	   in	  
behavior	   finance.291	   This	   article	   agrees	  with	   Joo’s	   observation	   that	   a	   shift	   appears	   to	   be	  
occurring,292	  but	  predicts	  a	  different	  outcome.	  It	  expects	  that	  the	  emerging	  innovations	  will	  
be	   generated	   within	   the	   aggregate	   contractarian	   theory.	   As	   this	   article	   has	   illustrated,	  
history	   indicates	   that	   the	   indeterminacy	  of	   a	   given	   essentialist	   theory	  of	   the	   corporation	  
allows	   for	   counter	   positions	   and	   apposing	   policy	   positions	   to	   emerge	  within	   it.293	   There	  
does	   not	   appear	   to	   be	   any	   reason	  why	   it	   would	   not	   happen	   again	   within	   the	   aggregate	  
contractarian	  theory.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  predicted	  that	  the	  aggregate	  contractarian	  theory	  
will	   remain	   the	   dominant	   theory	   approach	   in	   legal	   academia.	   Leading	   thinkers	   will	   still	  
regard	   the	   corporation	   as	   being	   a	   group	   of	   aggregate	   constituents	   who	   are	   connected	  
through	   contract,	   but	   their	   assumptions	   about	   contracts	   and	   markets	   will	   change	   to	  
accommodate	  factual	  circumstances,	  leading	  to	  different	  policy	  prescriptions.	  
	  
V.	  CONCLUSION	  
The	  contestation	  that	  has	  emerged	  about	  aggregate	  contractarian	  theory	  is	  like	  the	  
history	  of	  the	  entity	  theory	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.294	  As	  covered	  in	  this	  
article,	   the	   entity	   theory	   shifted	   from	   defending	   claims	   about	   the	   private	   nature	   of	   the	  
corporation	   to	   defending	   the	   opposite	   claim	   by	   the	   1930s.295	   And	   yet,	   the	   future	   of	  
corporate	   legal	   theory	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  this	  path	  dependent;	  history	  does	  not	  have	  to	  
repeat	   itself.	   As	   an	   alternative,	   we	   could	   embrace	   the	   indeterminacy	   of	   the	   aggregate	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contractarian	   theory	   (and	   the	  other	   essentialist	   theories	   of	   the	   corporation),	   providing	   a	  
path	   to	   a	   corporate	   legal	   discourse	   with	   greater	   contestation	   and	   complexity.	   Such	  
contestation	   and	   complexity	   ought	   to	   be	   welcomed.	   Joo	   argues	   when	   considering	   post-­‐
contractarian	   directions	   in	   corporate	   theory	   that,	   “[a]s	   the	   best	   theorists	   appreciate,	  
rational	  behavior	   theory,	   and	  grand	   constructs	   generally,	   offer	   ease	  of	   comprehension	  at	  
the	   cost	   of	   oversimplification.	   The	   spectacular	   recent	   failures	   in	   the	   financial	   markets	  
illustrate	  how	  the	  costs	  of	  oversimplification	  can	  outweigh	  the	  benefits.”296	  
Of	   course,	   Joo	   is	   not	   suggesting	   that	   there	   is	   a	   direct	   correlation	   between	   the	  
prevailing	   version	   of	   the	   aggregate	   contractarian	   theory	   and	   the	   recent	   failures	   in	   the	  
financial	  markets.	  Rather,	  he	  is	  suggesting	  that	  this	  example	  provides	  a	  dire	  warning	  about	  
how	   theorizing	   that	  blindly	   adheres	   to	  oversimplified	  versions	  of	   reality	   risks	  disastrous	  
results.297	   If	   Joo	   is	   correct,	   then	   corporate	   legal	   theory	   ought	   to	   offer	   complexity	   and	  
indeterminacy	   to	   legal	   thought,	   not	   an	   “ease	   of	   comprehension,”	   because	   such	  
“oversimplification”	  can	  lead	  to	  the	  serious	  risk	  of	  misapprehension	  and	  poor	  judgment.298	  
This	   final	   thought	   brings	   this	   article	   back	   to	   the	   introduction	   with	   Bratton’s	  
comment	   about	   the	   elements	   of	   a	   “wholesome”	   corporate	   legal	   dialectic.299	   Consider	   his	  
words	  carefully:	  	  
Whatever	  the	  future	   interplay	  of	  theory	  and	  power,	   the	  concepts	  that	  make	  
up	  theories	  of	  the	  firm	  –	  entity	  and	  aggregate,	  contract	  and	  concession,	  public	  
and	   private,	   discrete	   and	   relational	   –	   will	   stay	   in	   internal	   opposition.	   This	  
tendency	   toward	   contradiction	   should	   be	   accepted,	   not	   feared.	   The	  
contradictions	  are	  intrinsic.	  No	  foreseeable	  scholarship	  or	  legislative	  reform	  
will	   resolve	   them.	   The	   contradictions	   also	   are	   wholesome.	   Studying	   and	  
reflecting	  on	  their	  interplay	  in	  the	  law	  enhances	  our	  positive	  and	  normative	  
understanding.	  Legal	  theories	  that	  heavily	  privilege	  one	  or	  another	  opposing	  
concept	   risk	  positive	   error.	   Theory,	   instead	  of	   denying	   the	   existence	  of	   the	  
contradictions,	  should	  synchronize	  their	  coexistence	  in	  law.300	  
Unfortunately,	   this	   particular	   message	   of	   Bratton	   never	   gained	   enough	   traction	   in	  
corporate	  legal	  academia	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  quality	  of	  discourse	  that	  this	  passage	  suggests.	  	  
This	  article	  will	  end	  with	  the	  recommendation	  that	  it	  endorsed	  at	  the	  onset.	  We	  as	  
corporate	   scholars	   need	   be	   self-­‐critical	   of	   our	   roles	   in	   the	   manufacturing	   of	   corporate	  
knowledge	  and,	  in	  part,	  be	  leery	  of	  accepting	  a	  priori	  knowledge	  as	  fact.	  If	  we	  will	  do	  this,	  it	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